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Title VI closes the gap between our purposes as a democracy and our prejudices as
individuals. The cuts ofprejudice need healing. The costs ofprejudice need understand-
ing .... Title VI offers a place for the meeting of our minds as tofederal money. It can
recognize no prejudice. It affords a place for the meeting of our hearts, as prejudice must
yield to our common purposes, our common progress and the common perfection ofthese
United States.
Senator John 0. Pastore
March 3, 19641
INTRODUCTION
An estimated 84,570 minority patients die annually due to health care disparities2
that result, in no small part, from the unconscious racism that pervades the American
health care system. The fact that black and brown patients consistently receive
inferior medical treatment than their white counterparts has been documented be-
yond dispute.' These health care disparities persist even after controlling for income,
education, geography, socioeconomic status, insurance coverage, and every meaning-
ful comorbidity. Moreover, health care disparities produce disparate health out-
comes so that minorities die quicker 4 and sicker5 in America than whites, solely
1. 110 CONG. REc. 7045, 7064 (1964) (statement of Sen. John 0. Pastore).
2. David Satcher et al., What IfWe Were Equal? A Comparison of the Black-White Mortality Gap in 1960
and2000, 24 HEALTH AFF. 459, 459 (2005).
3. See generally COMM. ON UNDERSTANDING & ELIMINATING RACIAL & ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH-
CARE, UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE (Brian D.
Smedley et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter Disparities in Healthcare].
4. National Center for Health Statistics, Health, United States, 2012: With Special Feature on Emergency
Care, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 8 (May 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/
husl2.pdf.
5. Id. at 81-82 (Table 20).
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because of their race or ethnicity. This Article outlines the considerable progress the
scientific community has made in understanding physician bias, and argues that
changes to law and policy now must follow.
Studies have conhrmed that physicians, like most Americans, generally demon-
strate pro-white implicit biases against Latinos6 and African-Americans. These bi-
ases are unintentional and arise unconsciously. However, they have been shown to
adversely affect physicians' clinical decision-making to the severe detriment of minor-
ity patients. For example, in one study, as physicians' anti-black implicit bias levels
increased, their likelihood of prescribing the optimal treatment for coronary artery
disease to black patients decreased while the frequency with which they prescribed
optimal treatment to whites increased.8 Another pair of studies examined pediatri-
cians' clinical decision-making and found that physicians with greater pro-white
implicit biases more readily prescribed pain medication to white children than to
African-American children.' Other research has suggested that doctors misinterpret
population data in their patient assessments, allowing racial stereotypes to influence
their perceptions, leading them to automatically associate diseases arising from behav-
ioral choices-such as drug abuse and obesity-with blacks, while being less prompt
in accurately identifying these conditions in white patients.' 0 Physician implicit
biases have been associated with poorer communication between doctors and their
minority patients, as physicians hold shorter clinical encounters with minority pa-
tients, make less frequent eye contact, verbally dominate exchanges that allow for few
questions or comments from minority patients, and share less information with
minority patients than with white patients." Certainly, there is little evidence in case
law or elsewhere to suggest that bigotry, overt racism, or explicit prejudice are the
primary sources of the racial and ethnic discrimination that occurs in medicine. But
the fact that these differences are not due to bigotry is very much beside the most
important point. Patients from minority racial and ethnic backgrounds are discrimi-
nated against in health care, and the outcome of this discrimination is poorer health
and shorter lifespans than whites suffer in almost every category. Therefore, the
emerging body of literature that points to the influence of providers' implicit biases
to explain the regular patterns of disparate medical treatment cannot be ignored.
I argue in this Article that this empirical evidence of physician bias is not only a
likely explanation for the stagnant persistence of inequality in health care, but also
contributes substantially to the higher morbidity and mortality rates that minority
6. Irene V. Blair et al., Assessment ofBiases Against Latinos and African Americans Among Primary Care
Providers and Community Members, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 92 (2012) [hereinafter Blair etal.,Assessment].
7. Alexander R. Green et al., Implicit Bias among Physicians and its Prediction of Thrombolysis Decisions for
Black and White Patients, 22 J. INTERNAL MED. 1231, 1231-38 (2007).
8. Id. at 1231.
9. Janice A. Sabin & Anthony G. Greenwald, The Influence oflmplicit Bias on Treatment Recommendations
for 4 Common Pediatric Conditions: Pain, Urinary Tract Infection, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, and
Asthma, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 988 (2012).
10. Gordon B. Moskowitz et al., Implicit Stereotyping and Medical Decisions: Unconscious Stereotype Activa-
tion in Practitioners' Thoughts aboutAfrican-Americans, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 996 (2012).
11. Louis A. Penner et al., Aversive Racism and Medical Interactions with Black Patients: A Field Study,
46 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 436 (2010).
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Americans suffer as compared to whites. Moreover, I argue that the available scien-
tific evidence now compels legal scholars and jurists to examine the role that civil
rights law should play in addressing the deadly impact of racial discrimination due to
physician bias. This Article confronts unconscious racism as a significant cause of
health and health care disparities, and argues that the law and policy should meaning-
fully account for the resulting harms. Just as the Supreme Court has noted in the
employment context, in health care, physicians' "undisciplined system of subjective
[i.e., unintentional] decision-making can have precisely the same effects as a system
pervaded by impermissible intentional discrimination."'" Civil rights law was in-
tended to provide redress for precisely such injurious discrimination. Thus, numer-
ous legal scholars have argued fervently for the reform of anti-discrimination laws
that fail to reflect that unconscious rather than intentional racism has become the
new normal." Sadly, legislators and courts have not responded. I challenge law-
makers' apparent indifference to implicit bias discrimination, and intend to move
the somewhat stalled conversation in the legal literature forward, not only by adding
health care to the list of environments where implicit biases operate perniciously, but
also by adding new scientific findings and new legal solutions to the discourse.
First, I focus specifically on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, one of the
broadest of the civil rights era statutes, because that law has been almost entirely
overlooked in the conversation among scholars about how to address implicit bias
discrimination. Title VI has a rich history of being used as an effective tool to
eliminate segregation and overt racism in health care and reaches broadly beyond
health care to prohibit discrimination by any recipient of federal funds. Next, this
Article adds a comprehensive review of the social science literature on malleability:
the insight that unconscious prejudices can be altered.' 4 I introduce a body of social
science literature collected over the past twenty-five years, which shows that uninten-
tional and unconscious biases are neither inevitable nor impenetrable but instead
may be intentionally controlled through interventions such as stereotype-negation, 15
exposure to counter-stereotypes,' 6 and social norm-shifting" in order to reduce the
discriminatory effects of implicit biases on physician's clinical judgments and con-
duct. I propose that this malleability evidence provides a basis for crafting a legal
response to unconscious racism; in light of this evidence, physicians and others may
be held to a negligence standard of care in Title VI disparate treatment claims-
notwithstanding the Supreme Court's current fetish with what Professor Ian Haney-
12. Cf Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554 (2011).
13. But cf Gregory Mitchell & Philip Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils ofMindreading,
67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023 (2006).
14. Irene V. Blair, The Malleability ofAutomatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSY-
CHOL. REV. 242 (2002).
15. Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes andPrejudice: TheirAutomatic and Controlled Components, 56 J. PERSON-
ALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 5 (1989).
16. Nilanjana Dasgupa & Anthony Greenwald, On the Malleability ofAutomatic Attitudes: Combating
Automatic Prejudice with Images ofAdmired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
800 (2001).
17. Gretchen B. Sechrist & Charles Stangor, Perceived Consensus Influences Intergroup Behavior and Stereo-
type Accessibility, 80 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 645 (2001).
[Vol. 6:36
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L6pez has called "malicious" rather than "contextual" intent as a requirement to
prove and recover for actionable discrimination.' 8 Moreover, malleability evidence
provides the moral basis for Congress to amend Title VI and restore private enforce-
ment of disparate impact claims.
In 1987, when Charles Lawrence famously identified the false dichotomy between
unconstitutional intentional discrimination and constitutionally acceptable uninten-
tional discrimination,' 9 cognitive psychologists had barely scratched the surface of
the implicit bias held. Today, a massive evidentiary record is available to show how
powerfully unintentional bias informs discriminatory judgments and conduct, and
relating that science to anti-discrimination law. 20 Linda Krieger began advocating a
cognitive bias approach to equal employment opportunity in 1995.1 Since then, the
implicit bias discourse has focused primarily on employment discrimination and the
importance of addressing this form of prejudice under Title VT 22 as well as the Equal
Protection clause.23 Beyond employment, Professors Antony Page and Michael Pitts
identified implicit bias as an affront to voting integrity at polling places.24 Others
have considered the limitations of anti-discrimination law that fails to affect the
phenomenological realities of implicit bias in criminal justice,2 5 media and broadcast
policy,2 6 jury selection, 2  litigation advocacy, 2" and in judicial selection.
29 Professor
Kimani Paul-Emile has thoughtfully asserted that civil rights laws should accommo-
date patients' racial preferences3 0 and Professor Rene Bowser has linked physicians'
implicit bias to institutional patterns of racial profling in health care.3 ' However,
18. Ian F. Haney-L6pez, Institutional Racism:Judicial Conduct and a New Theory ofRacial Discrimination,
109 YALE L.J. 1717 (2000).
19. Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,
39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987).
20. Anthony Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L.
REV. 945, 959 (2006); Christine Jolls & Cass Sunstein, The Law ofImplicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REv. 969
(2006).
21. Linda Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal
Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161 (1995).
22. See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach,
101 COLUM. L. REv. 458 (2001); Tristen K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a
StructuralAccountofDisparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. LAwREv. 91 (2003).
23. Ian F. Haney-L6pez, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779 (2012).
24. Antony Page & Michael J. Pitts, Poll Workers, Election Administration, and the Problem oflmplicit Bias,
15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (2009).
25. See R. Richard Banks et al., Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CALIF.
L. REV. 1169, 1169 n. 1 (2006); see also Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact ofImplicit Racial
Bias on the Exercise ofProsecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795 (2012).
26. See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses ofRace, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1491 (2005).
27. See Haney-L6pez, supra note 23.
28. Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 1241 (2002); Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decision-makers break the Preju-
dice Habit, 83 CALIF. L. REv. 733 (1995).
29. See, Lateef Mtima, The Road to the Bench: Not Even Good (Subliminal) Intentions, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 135 (2001).
30. Kimani Paul-Emile, Patients'RacialPreferences and the Medical Culture ofAccommodation, 60 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 462 (2012).
31. Rene Bowser, Racial Profiling in Health Care: An InstitutionalAnalysis ofMedical Treatment Disparities,
20 14] 7
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this Article offers a systematic and comprehensive review of the evidence that indi-
vidual physicians' unconscious racism has become the new normal form of racial and
ethnic discrimination in medicine, which current law completely ignores. This is the
hrst article to present an in-depth treatment of the role that physician implicit bias
plays in producing inequality in the health care system; the first article in the legal
literature to comprehensively review the social science evidence that implicit biases
are malleable; and the first article to examine how this knowledge must change our
approach to Title VI anti-discrimination jurisprudence.
In this Article, I make three arguments. First, I argue that the deadly connection
between physicians' implicit racial bias and health care disparities in the United
States compels legal attention. Second, I argue the scientific evidence collected over
more than two decades contradicts the assumption that unconscious racism is inevi-
table, impenetrable, and inaccessible to human control. In fact, the evidence of
malleability demonstrates that unconscious racism is within the intentional control
of actors and institutions whose discriminatory judgments and conduct unintention-
ally harm minority patients. I assert that this evidence of malleability is a legal
"game-changer," as malleability evidence provides the scientific leverage that has
been missing from the debate about personal and legal accountability for discrimina-
tory harms that result from unintentional and subconscious racism. Third, I apply
the science of implicit bias to advocate reform of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964." I argue that discrimination due to implicit bias reaches and therefore should
be penalized more broadly than courts and legislatures have acknowledged to date.
Based on the social science record, Title VI can be restored to an effective legal
weapon against lethal discrimination in health care delivery, and wherever the dis-
criminators are recipients of federal funds, whether the racial bias is deliberate and
intentional, or subtle and subconsciously motivated.
Part I describes the two shortcomings of current Title VI jurisprudence. This
section explains the need for a legislative correction of the courts' shambolic analysis
of disparate impact claims, and lays the foundation for a new rule of judicial construc-
tion to replace current Title VI jurisprudence, which is sadly out of step with modern
forms of discrimination. Part II turns to the evidence of implicit bias in the American
health care system as an exemplar of the un-checked harm caused by an ineffective
Title VI. Part III introduces the scientific evidence that implicit biases are malleable.
Because the data in these sections has heretofore been absent from the legal literature-
and, as such, supports a fundamental shift in the discourse regarding implicit bias,
intentionality, and causation in anti-discrimination law-I carefully review a broad
sample of experiments and their results. Part IV puts the malleability evidence to
work, providing an evidence-based reconceptualization of Title VI that accounts for
reality of contemporary discrimination and the historical goals of the Civil Rights
7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 79 (2001); see also Michael S. Shin, Note, Redressing Wounds: Finding a Legal
Framework to Remedy Racial Disparities in Medical Care, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 2047 (2002) (a very good
law-student note on the topic).
32. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VI, 78 Stat. 241, 252-53 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-
2000d-4 a (2006)).
[Vol. 6:38
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Act of 1964. After responding to the objections to my analysis that are sure to arise, I
conclude with a discussion of the restorative impact that reforming Title VI will have
beyond the health care context.
I. THE NEED FOR REFORM
Congress has changed neither the plain language nor their legislative intent for
Title VI since its enactment. The statute prohibits racial and ethnic discrimination in
all sectors of the American economy where federal funds are expended, including
in health care delivery.3 - Section 601 of the Act declares that "[n]o person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal assistance." 4 Section 602 goes on to state
that " [e]ach Federal department and agency . .. is authorized and directed to effectu-
ate the provisions of section 2000d [Section 601] of this title . . . [,]"" thus giving
administrative agencies the authority to promulgate regulations consistent with the
aims of the law. Although the statute's provisions have endured, its effectiveness to
control discrimination has not. Federal courts have systematically eviscerated the
protection against discrimination Title VI was intended to provide.3 6
Judicial interpretations continue to permit recovery against programs and insti-
tutions that "deliberately" and "intentionally" discriminate against minorities.3  A
plaintiff wishing to recover for disparate treatment must first establish a primafacie
case by producing evidence to show the defendant intentionally treated a person
who is a member of a protected class less favorably than similarly situated non-
minorities.38 If a plaintiffs disparate treatment case does not include direct evidence
of intentional discrimination, the plaintiff may alternatively prove intent indirectly
using the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.3 9 To
33. Although Title VI broadly prohibits discrimination by any recipient of federal assistance, see id. at
§ 2000d, I focus in this Article on the law's application to the health-care delivery system as the chosen
example for analytical purposes, for reasons described earlier. The analysis here extends beyond the health care
sector.
34. Id.
35. Id. at § 2000d-1.
36. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (holding that Tide VI no longer provides a
private right of action to enforce disparate impact claims).
37. See, e.g., Maislin v. Tennessee State University, 665 F. Supp. 2d 922, 928 (M.D. Tenn. 2009)
(holding that deliberate indifference to a hostile work environment is actionable under Tide VI); see aso
White v. Engler, 188 F. Supp. 2d 730 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (denying a motion to dismiss a class action filed
against a state board of education and state employees, alleging that a state-sponsored award program discrimi-
nated against students of color). s action alleging intentional discrimination in violation of Title VI).
38. See, e.g., Chance v. Reed, 538 F. Supp. 2d 500 (D.Conn. 2008) (citing Jackson v. University of
New Haven, 228 F. Supp. 2d 156, 159 (D.Conn.2002) (dismissing plaintiffs Title VI claim and holding that
because plaintiff did not offer direct evidence of discriminatory intent, plaintiff must first establish aprimafacie
case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework); McDonnell Douglass Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Koumantaros v. City University of New York, No. 03 Civ. 10170 (GEL),
2007 WL 840115 at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19,2007).
39. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792; see also, e.g., Hilliard v. Vilsack, No. 5:10-CV-202-BO, 2011 WL
474588 (E.D.N.C. Feb 4, 2011) (citing McDonnell Douglass, 411 U.S. 792; Crestar Banks v. Driggs, No. 93-
20 14] 9
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prevail under either approach, the Title VI plaintiff must finally demonstrate evi-
dence of intent.4 0 Despite copious evidence that overt and intentional discrimina-
tion has long been out of vogue in America, 4 ' courts have struggled for a principled
way to extend Title VI prohibitions beyond merely intentional discrimination, un-
able to distinguish, much less penalize, unintentional4 2 or unconscious4 ' discrimina-
tion. Title VI ostensibly prohibits facially neutral programs and policies that
nonetheless have a disparately discriminatory impact on minorities.4 4 Although pri-
vate parties may no longer assert these claims of unintentional harm, the government
may make aprimafacie showing of disparate impact by presenting statistical evidence
that a practice or program has an adverse impact on a protected group, thus creating
a presumption of discrimination.45 If the defendant is able to show a legitimate,
non-discriminatory purpose for the challenged practice, then the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to overcome this showing by demonstrating a less discriminatory alternative
was available but was not implemented.
The Supreme Court's flip-flop on this Title VI doctrine has been whiplash induc-
ing. In Lau v. Nichols,4 the Court held that disparate impact actions were colorable
under Section 601,48 but in University of California v. Bakke,4 9 the Court held the
opposite, only to reverse itself once again in GuardiansAssn v. Civil Service Commis-
sion ofNew York,5 0and then later to change the statutory basis for disparate impact
claims in Alexander v. Choate." In Alexander v. Sandoval, of course, the Supreme
Court sounded the death knell to private causes of action alleging disparate impact,
but left open the possibility of administrative enforcement for these claims.5 2 The
result is a hopeless tangle of confusing Title VI jurisprudence, and worse, a law that is
1036, 1993 WL 198187 (4th Cir. June 11, 1993); Cooley v. Sterling Bank, 280 F. Supp. 2d 1331,1337
(M.D. Ala. 2003); Shiplet v. Venemen, 620 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1223 (D. Mt. 2009)) (dismissing a Tide VI
claim brought by black and female farmers against U.S. Department ofAgriculture).
40. See, e.g., Lanier v. Clovis Unified School District, No. 1:11 -cv-01613-LJO-GSA, 2013 WL 2457362
(E.D. Ca. June 6, 2013) (citing Rodriguez v. California Highway Patrol, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1139 (N.D.
Ca. 2000)) (dismissing plaintiffs Title VI claim and explaining that the statute requires proof of discrimina-
tory intent).
41. See generally HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND INTERPRETA-
TIONS (Harv. Univ. Press rev. ed. 1998).
42. See U.S. v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 745 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (drawing a distinction
between discrimination due to apathy versus discriminatory animus).
43. See Grutterv. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344-46 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
44. See Floyd v. New York City, 813 F. Supp. 2d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); but cf Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d
307 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that Title VI applies only to intentional discrimination).
45. Alexander, 532 U.S. at 282.
46. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). Congress rejected the
Supreme Court's interpretation, as articulated in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989),
choosing instead to codify the disparate impact burden-shifting scheme from Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971).
47. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
48. Id. at 566.
49. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
50. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
51. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
52. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
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virtually meaningless as a measure to protect racial and ethnic minorities in America
against modern forms of discrimination.
The lower courts currently reach outcomes in both disparate treatment and dispa-
rate impact cases that are incongruous with the language and purpose of Title VI. For
example, in a Pennsylvania case, the court dismissed allegations of racial discrimina-
tion by a class of minority students who showed the defendant school district system-
atically removed black students from the mainstream educational curriculum by
misidentifying them as disabled and unfairly assigning them to special needs classes.5 3
The plaintiffs presented statistical data sufficient to make out a primafacie case on
disparate impact grounds,5 4 but due to Sana'oval, these private litigants were forced
to allege a disparate treatment case.5 5 Consequently, their claims were denied when
the court concluded the school did not act with "discriminatory purpose" to segre-
gate minority students into inferior educational programs.> The litigants' claims in
this Pennsylvania case were essentially disparate impact allegations that fell victim to
disparate treatment analysis based on motive and intent. In another instance, a
New York court simply ignored a plaintiffs evidence that the state's Department of
Labor policies and procedures systematically disadvantaged Hispanic customers be-
cause her complaints "focused on disparate impact on Hispanic LEP customers, not
intentional discrimination."
The focus of Title VI litigation must be clarified. First, the disparate impact cause
of action must be returned to private enforcers as originally intended by the statute's
framers, and as supported by nearly 40 years of common law tradition. Second, the
courts must move beyond outdated notions of intentionality to allow Title VI cases
to proceed under theories of recovery that reflect the way discriminators behave in
reality. For years, scholars have pointed to the dissonance between anti-discrimina-
tion law and the behavior it seeks to regulate. Nowhere is the disconnect between
Congress' intent underlying Title VI and the role to which courts have demoted this
cause of action become more apparent than in the field of health care. The American
health care system is a fitting focus for antidiscrimination law because the problem of
racial inequality in health care remains one of the most pervasive, unsolved racial and
ethnic injustices in America. The evidence of the devastating impact of implicit bias
on health and health care disparities continues to mount, despite the fact that the
problem is a top priority for American lawmakers, policymakers, health providers,
and patients. Although the social science literature is bursting with scientific evidence
that shows the power of implicit bias to cause health inequity, that evidence has not
been translated into information that law- and policy-makers can use. If Title VI can
be revived to fight discrimination due to implicit bias in health care, then the health
53. Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 826 F. Supp. 2d 749 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
54. These data concerned disproportionate representation of blacks in disabled classes, evidence of indi-
vidual misdiagnoses, the school district's procedural irregularities in testing, evidence of disparate learning
opportunities, and the underrepresentation of minority administrators throughout the school district. Id. at
761.
55. See id. at 752.
56. Id. at764 .
57. Morales v. N.Y. St. Dep't of Labor, 865 F. Supp. 2d 220 (N.D.N.Y. 2012).
20 14] I I
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care example may extend to many settings, including education, employment, and,
civil, as well as criminal, law enforcement.
A. Title VI and Health Care Equity
From its inception, health care equity has been at the core of the legislative
purpose for Title VI.58 The record of the floor debate as the Senate considered this
landmark civil rights act reveals that proponents repeatedly cited and quoted a
watershed hospital desegregation case as part of their pleas for the bill's passage.5 9
The case, Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, was brought by black physi-
cians, dentists, and patients to challenge racial segregation in a publically financed
hospital.60 The defendant hospital had received funds under the Hill-Burton Act, by
which Congress had exercised its spending power to distribute federal grants for
construction and renovation of racially segregated hospitals since 1946.61 The
Fourth Circuit held in Simkins that the separate-but-equal language contained in the
Hill-Burton Act was unconstitutional. On March 2, 1964, the United States
Supreme Court announced its decision to deny certiorari in Simkins. 6 On March 30,
1964, just after the Supreme Court declined to disturb this holding, the bill propos-
ing Title VI came before the full Senate for debate.6 4 Senators regarded the Supreme
Court's decision not to hear Simkins as a clear signal that the Court had concluded
that the "separate but equal" doctrine, as applied to hospitals, violated the Equal
Protection Clause.6 5 Moreover, the Supreme Court's decision was seen as validation
of the important anti-discrimination goals set out in Title VI, and as recognition that
58. This historical fact makes the law's impotence in the face of persistent and pervasive health care
disparities particularly ironic. Shamefully, the most recent Title VI case that in any way addresses health care
inequities was an action brought by physicians and an organization "dedicated to the preservation and
promotion of a common language-English-in American political and governmental life," alleging that
requiring medical providers to provide translation services to non-English speaking patients violated Title VI.
See Colwell v. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 558 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2009) (dismissing the action as
unripe).
59. I refer here to the views of the majority that prevailed in enacting this legislation, but I do not mean to
imply that Congress displayed unanimity of thought and mind in passing this law. The Congressional
coalitions that reached compromise to enact Title VI were not homogeneous. In their account, Professors
Rodriguez and Weingast explain that there were ardent supporters (mostly northern Democrats), ardent
opponents (mostly southern Republicans) and a number of moderates who eventually passed Title VI.
Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory ofLegislative History: New Perspectives
on the 1964 CivilRightsActandits Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417 (2003).
60. Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 969 (4th Cir. 1963).
61. The full title of the statute is The Hospital Survey and Construction Act, 42 U.S.C. § 291(c)(e)(2)
(2006).
62. Simkins, 323 F.2d at 969-70.
63. Moses H. Cone Mem'lHospital v. Simkins, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
64. For discussion of legislative history and implementation of Title VI see Comment, Civil Rights Act of
1964 Implementation and Impact, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV., 824, 828-829 (1968); see also 110 CONG. REC.
6561 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Kuchel, relying on Simkins as evidence of judicial support for the conclusion
that public funding of separate-but-equal services is unconstitutional).
65. For a legislative history and discussion of the impact that the Simkins case had on Tide VI floor debate,
see DAVID BARTON SMITH, HEALTH CARE DIVIDED: RACE AND HEALING A NATION 101-05 (1999).
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piecemeal litigation was insufficient to dismantle discrimination in the nation's hospi-
tals. Senator John Pastore of Rhode Island famously declared as follows:
The Supreme Court declined to review that decision; so it is the law of our land.
Yet despite the effort of the Court of Appeals to strike down discrimination in the
Simkins case, the same court was forced last week to rule again in a Wilmington,
N.C., suit that a private hospital operated with public funds must desist from
barring Negro physicians from staff membership. That is why we need title VI of
the Civil Rights Act, H.R. 7152-to prevent such discrimination where Federal
funds are involved. Title VI intends to insure once and for all that the financial
resources of the Federal Government-the commonwealth of Negro and white
alike-will no longer subsidize racial discrimination.6 6
Congress clearly read the decision not to disturb the Fourth Circuit's condemnation
of the "massive use of public funds and extensive state-funding" to support hospital
segregation as both as a prelude to and an impetus for the enactment of Title VI.6
Today, the statute's language stands unchanged and continues to cover all health
care providers who receive federal assistance from Medicare, Medicaid, and other
federally funded health insurance programs.6 8 Indeed, Congress recently reiterated
its intent to use Title VI to address health care inequity in the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA).69 Yet PPACA's nondiscrimination provision
that expressly incorporates Title VI will mean absolutely nothing without meaning-
ful reform to Title VI. Today, nearly 50 years after Title VI became law, the judicial
interpretations of the law make it nearly irrelevant to modern day discrimination
generally, and particularly ineffective at combating the deadly race and ethnic dispari-
ties in health care.
B. The Shocking Inhumanity of Unjust Health Care
Martin Luther King, Jr. is traditionally credited with declaring, "of all the forms of
inequality, injustice in health care is the most shocking and inhumane" in a speech to
66. 110 CONG. REc. 2481,4183 (1964).
67. "But we emphasize that this is not merely a controversy over a sum of money. Viewed from the
plaintiffs' standpoint it is an effort by a group of citizens to escape the consequences of discrimination in a
concern touching health and life itself. . . . Such involvement in discriminatory action 'it was the design of
the Fourteenth Amendment to condemn."' Simkins, 323 F.2d at 967-68 (quoting Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715,724 (1961)).
68. In 2009, this funding totaled $715 billion, and last year, the United States government paid 36.4% of
the nation's national health care expenditures. See National Center for Health Statistics, Health, UnitedStates,
2011: With SpecialFeature on Socioeconomic Status and Health, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVEN-
TION 376 (May 2012), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus11.pdf.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2006) ("Except as otherwise provided for in this title (or an amendment made
by this title), an individual shall not, on the ground prohibited under title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.), ... be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under, any health program or activity, any part of which is receiving Federal financial assis-
tance, including credits, subsidies, or contracts of insurance, or under any program or activity that is adminis-
tered by an Executive Agency or any entity established under this title (or amendments). The enforcement
mechanisms provided for and available under such title VI, ... shall apply for purposes of violations of this
subsection.").
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the Medical Committee for Human Rights in 1966."0 This declaration remains true
today. No individual can participate fully in society, or compete effectively for its
resources and rewards, without good health." Thus, any person or group unjustly
denied an equal opportunity to be healthy also ignominiously suffers exclusion from
all other opportunities including the chance to successfully meet their most basic
needs such as housing, food security, education, and employment. This section of
this Article samples the overwhelming scientific evidence that shows that minorities
in America are unjustly denied an equal opportunity to be healthy. Moreover, it
supports the conclusion that physician prejudice, bias, and stereotypes are substantial
contributors to racial and ethnic health disparities. Three examples from the medical
literature are instructive.
1. Disparate Treatment Leads To Disparate Outcomes for Heart Disease Patients
African Americans are three times as likely as whites to develop cardiovascular
disease and are twice as likely to die from it.n Nevertheless, after controlling for
genetic differences in risk factors, socioeconomic status, health behaviors, and
access to care, race and ethnicity have been well-documented determinants of the
quality of treatment that minorities receive for heart and vascular diseases.7
Minority patients receive less education and counseling about life-saving preventa-
tive behaviors. Physicians are less likely to counsel black patients to modify risk
factors for heart disease such as smoking cessation, diet modification, and increasing
exercise. 8 Once African-Americans fall ill, they are more likely to receive poor
quality care than are white patients. Blacks are less likely than whites to be admitted
70. See, e.g., HHS Advisory Committee on Minority Health, Ensuring that Health Care Reform WillMeet
the Health Care Needs ofMinority Communities and Eliminate Health Disparities: A Statement ofPrincples and
Recommendations, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. i (2009), http://minorityhealth.hhs.gov/Assets/pdf/
Checked/1/ACMH HealthCareAccessReport.pdf.
71. Norman Daniels etal., Why Justice is Good for our Health: The Social Determinants ofHealth Inequali-
ties, 128 DAEDALUs 215 (1999).
72. Contessa Fincher et al., Racial Disparities in Coronary Heart Disease: A Sociological View ofthe Medical
Literature on Physician Bias, 14 ETHNICITY & DISEASE 360, 360 (2004).
73. Pamela Sankar et al., Genetic Research and Health Disparities, 291 JAMA 2985 (2004) (cautioning
against overemphasizing genetic over social and environmental influences on health disparities).
74. David R. Williams, Race, Socioeconomic Status, and Health the Added Effects ofRacism and Discrimina-
tion, 896 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SC. 173 (1999) (Disentangling effect of racism and discrimination from socioeco-
nomic status on health disparities).
75. William W. Dressler et al., Race and Ethnicity in Public Health Research: Models to Explain Health
Disparities, 34 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 231 (2005) (finding little evidence to support the conclusion that
that health behaviors or genetic differences can explain racial and ethnic health disparities).
76. Kevin Fiscella et al., Disparities in Health Care by Race, Ethnicity, and Language among the Insured:
Findings fom a NationalSample, 40 MED. CARE 52 (2002) (finding that differences in access to health care do
not explain racial and ethnic health disparities).
77. See, e.g., Kevin A. Schulman et al., The Effect of Race and Sex on Physicians' Recommendations for
Cardiac Catheterization, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 618 (1999).
78. Donald H. Gemson et al., Differences in Physician Prevention Practice Patterns for White and Minority
Patients, 13 JOURNAL OF CMTY. HEALTH 53 (1988); Catalina Lopez-Quintero et al., Racial/Ethnic Disparities
in Report of Physician-Provided Smoking Cessation Advice: Analysis of the 2000 National Health Interview
Survey, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2235 (2006).
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for coronary artery bypass surgery9 and less likely to be triaged for coronary heart
disease.8 o One study showed that African-Americans were less ready for discharge
than other coronary heart disease patients, based on a cross-sectional sample of
10,000 Medicare patients discharged from 297 hospitals in live states."' Over a
dozen studies have demonstrated persistent "underuse" of invasive procedures that
are effective in treating coronary disease such as angiography and bypass graft surgery
in African-Americans as compared with white patients. 2 With respect to medical
instead of invasive treatments, the data is more mixed. Studies generally show no
difference in physicians' use of aspirin or beta-blockers to treat heart disease in black
and white patients; however, blacks are less likely to receive thrombolysis when it is
clinically indicated, and one study showed that African-American women are the
least likely demographic group to receive cardiac catheterization treatments for heart
disease. 3
In addition to the evidence of clinical disparities, providers show bias in their
social judgments and expectations about treating black and white patients with
coronary complaints, even before the clinical encounter begins. For example, one
group of researchers found that race significantly influenced physicians' perceptions
of minority patients' education and physical activity preferences and for minority
male patients.84 For the male patients in the study, these perceptions were a signifi-
cant predictor of the doctors' clinical recommendations.8 5 In other words, negative
racial perceptions significantly influenced doctors' clinical recommendations to mi-
nority male patients even after controlling for clinical appropriateness and the pa-
tient's ability to pay.6 ' Several studies demonstrate that physicians perceive blacks
and low-income patients more negatively than white and higher income patients.8
The decision to diagnose, treat, and monitor a patient's illness depends not only
on the technical assessment of objective data, but also on physician interpretations of
that data and social information as it pertains to particular patients. Whether the
providers are medical students, private doctors, public hospital physicians, public
health workers, nurses, or staff, researchers are beginning to find multiple pathways
79. Edward L Hannan et al., Access to Coronary Artery Bypass Surgery by Race/Ethnicity and Gender among
Patients Who are Appropriatefor Surgery, 37 MED. CARE 68 (1999).
80. Stuart E. Sheifer et al., Race and Sex Differences in the Management of Coronary Artery Disease, 139 AM.
HEARTJ. 848 (2000).
81. Katherine L. Kahn et al., Health Care for Black and Poor Hospitalized Medicare Patients, 271 JAMA
1169 (1994).
82. See, e.g., David M. Carlisle et al., Racial and Ethnic Differences in the Use ofInvasive Cardiac Procedures
among Cardiac Patients in Los Angeles County, 1986 through 1988, 85 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 352 (1995);
Steven P. Sedlis et al., Racial Differences in Performance of Invasive Cardiac Procedures in a Department of
Veterans Affairs Medical Center, 50 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 899 (1997).
83. Schulman et al., supra note 77, at 623-25.
84. Michelle van Ryn et al., Physicians'Perceptions ofPatients'Social and Behavioral Characteristics and Race




87. Michelle van Ryn & Jane Burke, The Effect ofPatient Race and Socio-Economic Status on Physicians'
Perceptions ofPatients, 50 Soc. Sc. & MED. 813 (2000).
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through which these providers bring negative, prior beliefs about minority patients'
intelligence, proclivity to engage in risky behavior, likelihood of medical cooperative-
ness, and adherence to treatment recommendations- unlike their positive expecta-
tions of white patients.8 " Even more important, the evidence shows that these dis-
parate perceptions can have a disparately detrimental impact on health outcomes. 9
2. Disparate Treatment Leads To Disparate Outcomes for Renal Patients
Despite the fact that black Americans represent a disproportionate number of
patients with end-stage renal disease (ESRD),90 they are far less likely to receive
aggressive or high quality care for this treatable disease. For patients with ESRD,
there are only two treatment possibilities: dialysis therapy or kidney transplant. 9 '
Transplants are the treatment of choice, offering longer life expectancy, especially if
the transplant occurs before dialysis. 9 2 Younger patients live even longer, though
older adults-even at age seventy-five- gain an average of four or more years of
longevity from transplant than if they remained on dialysis.93 Therefore, the exten-
sive documentation of race and ethnicity disparities in the evaluation for, placement,
and rate of transplants between blacks and whites describes a lethal injustice.
Disparate treatment for minority renal patients runs through the entire scope of
their clinical experience, beginning with the inferior education and information
sharing that they are offered when compared with whites. One study, in which 1,500
black and white renal patients were interviewed and 300 nephrologists were sur-
veyed, found "African-American patients were less likely than white patients to have
a complete evaluation to determine whether they were clinically appropriate for
transplantation."9 4 However, researchers have demonstrated that differences in black
88. Michelle van Ryn et al., Paved with Good Intentions: Do Public Health and Human Service Providers
Contribute to Racial/Ethnic Disparities in Health? 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 248 (2003); Shelley White-Means
et al., Cultural Competency, Race and Skin Tone Bias among Pharmacy, Nursing, and Medical Students, 66 MED.
CARE REs. & REv. 436 (2009)
89. Ana I. Balsa & Thomas G. McGuire, Prejudice, Clinical Uncertainty and Stereotyping as Sources of
Health Disparities, 22 J. HEALTH EcoN. 89 (2003).
90. See, Nat'l Kidney & Urologic Diseases Info. Clearinghouse, Kidney Disease Statistics for the United
States, NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH (June 2012), http://kidney.niddk.nih.gov/kudiseases/pubs/kustats/
KU Diseases Stats 5 08.pdf [hereinafter Clearinghouse, Statistics]. Black Americans are at substantially greater
risk for end-stage renal disease (ESRD) than white Americans; they represent one third of all ESRD patients,
but only 13% of the total U.S. population. Andy I. Choi et al., White/Black Racial Differences in Risk of
End-Stage RenalDisease and Death, 122 AM. J. MED. 622, 623 (2009). ESRD incident rates are more than
three times higher forAfrican Americans than for whites, though since 2000, the incident rates for all races has
stabilized and since 2001, the incidence rate for Native Americans for ESRD from all causes has been
declining. Clearinghouse, Statistics, supra, at 3. Nevertheless, rates of prevalent ESRD remains greatest among
blacks and Native American populations. See id.; see also Prcis: An Introduction to End-Stage Renal Disease in
the United States, 58 AM. J. KIDNEY DISEASES el7 (2011).
91. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Center, The Benefits of Transplant versus Dialysis, HARV. MED. SCH.,
http://www.bidmc.org/Centers-and-Departments/Departments/Transplant-Institute/Kidney/The-Benefits-
of-Transplant-versus-Dialysis.aspx (last visited Feb. 14, 2014).
92. John Z. Ayanian, Determinants ofRacial and Ethnic Disparities in Surgical Care, 32 WORLD J. SURGERY
509, 512 (2008).
93. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Center, supra note 91.
94. Ayanian, supra note 92, at 512.
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and white patient preferences explain only a small fraction of these treatment differ-
ences.95 In the same study, among patients who reported they were certain they
wanted a transplant, black patients were less likely than whites to be referred for
transplant evaluation, and less likely to be placed on a transplant waiting list. 9
Predictably, numerous studies show that black patients receive transplants at a signifi-
cantly lower rate than white patients, even adjusting for patient preferences, expecta-
tions, type of treatment facility, socio-demographics, health status, comorbidities,
and the cause of renal conditions.9
3. Disparate Treatment Leads To Disparate Outcomes for Cancer Patients
Racial disparities in cancer treatment have been directly linked to disparities in
long-term survival.98 For example, a research group from the University of Texas
demonstrated that in 31% of the black patient cases reviewed, patients with poten-
tially resectable pancreatic cancers never received a surgical evaluation, as compared
to 23% of whites.9 9 Once seen by a surgeon, blacks were still significantly less likely
to receive surgical resection.' 00 The unadjusted data showed a worse overall survival
rate for blacks than for whites, but when the data were adjusted for receiving surgical
resection, racial disparities in long-term survival disappeared.' 0 '
Despite this research, conjecture that such survival disparities are due to biological
differences in patients has persisted.' 0 2 Dr. Peter Bach sought to challenge this
conjecture. Dr. Bach's research team sought to determine whether the racial dispari-
ties in survival between blacks and whites persisted where the patients all received the
same treatments for similar stages of cancer, regardless of their race.o'0 In their
systematic review of the literature, Dr. Bach's research team evaluated eighty-nine
cohorts of patients who received comparable treatment for similar stage cancers. o4
Across the 89 cohorts, which involved analyses of survival rates for over 32,000 black
patients and 189,000 white patients, Dr. Bach found that blacks who received
comparable treatment for similar stage cancers, after adjusting for differences in
population mortality, suffered only 107% of the mortality rate experienced by
95. Id; John Z. Ayanian et al., The Effect of Patients' Preferences on Racial Differences in Access to Renal
Transplantation, 341 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1661 (1999).
96. Ayanian, supra note 92, at 512.
97. See, e.g., Alexander K. Smith et al., Racial/Ethnic Disparities in Liver Transplant Surgery and Hospice use:
Parallels, Differences, and Unanswered Questions, 25 AM. J. HOSPICE AND PALLIATIVE MED. 285 (2008).
98. Taylor S. Riall, Dissecting Racial Disparities in the Treatment of Patients with Locoregional Pancreatic
Cancer:A Two-Step Process, 116 CANCER 930, 930 (2010).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 935-36.
101. Id. at 936.
102. For example, in a study sponsored by the National Cancer Institute, survival rates for blacks and
whites with colon, breast, uterus, and bladder cancer found that lower survival rates persisted for blacks with
all four types of cancer, and persisted even after adjusting for clinical and socioeconomic characteristics.
Peter B. Bach etal., Survival ofBlacks and Whites after a Cancer Diagnosis, 287 JAMA 2106, 2106 (2002).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2108.
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whites.o'0 Moreover, for three of the four most common cancers-lung, colorectal,
and prostate-there was no evidence of excess cancer mortality in blacks.' 0 6 Dr. Bach
concluded that differences in cancer biology between racial groups are unlikely to be
responsible for a substantial portion of survival disparities.' 0 Instead, disparities are
more likely the result of disparate cancer treatment.'s Dr. Bach's conclusion not
only replicates numerous studies that have demonstrated that African-Americans are
less likely to receive optimal care for cancer,1o' but also provides a basis for the
conclusion that differences in treatment by race also result in differences in survival
rates among white and minority cancer patients. 0 The fact that blacks and whites
enjoy similar survival rates when treated comparably for similar stage cancers must be
regarded with alarm, because it conhrms that discrimination in health care is deadly.
The three examples from heart, cancer, and renal disease data summarized here are
illustrative but far from exhaustive. The Institute of Medicine (TOM) gathered evi-
dence that disparate treatment of disease and injury in the United States are pervasive
across a broad variety of medical conditions and settings."' Following the publica-
tion of the IOM's report, a maelstrom of debate erupted, because the IOM posited
that physicians might significantly contribute to health disparities, due to their biases,
prejudices, and stereotypes." 2 Critics asserted the whole disparities problem is a
"myth,"" 3 apparently imagining away the "veritable mountain of empirical studies"
that even detractors admit conhrms pervasive racial and ethnic disparities in Ameri-
cans' health, health care access, and health care quality."' A small but stolid group of
scientists offered a biological explanation for health disparities, arguing the discred-
ited view that racial groups in the United States are genetically similar to their
105. Id. at 2110.
106. Id. at 2111.
107. Id. at 2111-12.
10 8. Id.
109. Nina A. Bickell et al., Missed Opportunities: Racial Disparities in Adjuvant Breast Cancer Treatment,
24 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1357 (2006); Paula Diehr, Treatment Modality and Quality Diferences for Black
and White Breast Cancer Patients Treated in Community Hospitals, 27 MED. CARE 942 (1989); Carrie N.
Klabunde, Trends and Black/White Diferences in Treatment for Nonmetastatic Prostate Cancer, 36 MED. CARE
1337 (1998); James A. Lee et al., Medicare Treatment Diferences for Blacks and Whites, 35 MED. CARE 1173
(1997); Vickie L. Shavers et al., Racial and Ethnic Disparities in the Receipt of Cancer Treatment, 94 J. NAT'L
CANCER INST. 334 (2002); Robert M. Mayberry et al., Determinants ofBlack/White Differences in Colon
Cancer Survival, 87 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1686 (1995); Thomas J. Smith et al., Differences in Initial
Treatment Patterns and Outcomes ofLung Cancer in the Elderly, 13 LUNG CANCER 235 (1995).
110. See Bach, supra note 102, at 2110-12.
111. For a comprehensive literature review of scientific studies showing health disparities, see generally
Unequal Treatment, supra note 3.
112. See, e.g., Sally Satel & Jonathan Klick, The Institute ofMedicine Report: Too Quick to Diagnose Bias,
48 PERSP. IN BIOL & MED. S15 (2005). One critic warned that the IOM too quickly leaped from evidence of
disparities to a conclusion that discrimination in medicine is illicit, without sufficient evidence that discrimina-
tion by doctors is not economically rational. Richard A. Epstein, Disparities and Discrimination in Health Care
Coverate: A Critique ofthe Institute ofMedicine Study, 48 PERSP. IN BIOL. & MED. S26, S32-33 (2005).
Richard Epstein asserted the IOM Report shamefully attacked dedicated physicians' "good will" and dismiss-
ing the report as a "genteel guilt trip." Id. at S40.
113. JONATHAN KLICK & SALLY SATEL, THE HEALTH DISPARITIES MYTH: DIAGNOSING THE TREATMENT
GAP (2006).
114. Epstein, supra note 112, at S27.
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pre-historic human ancestors and these genetic similarities determine biologically
meaningful distinctions among American racial groups."' More thoughtful research-
ers, including historical epidemiologists," 6 sociologists," philosophers," 8 and hosts
of physicians"' have cited social determinants, reasoning that racial disparities in
health derive from interplay between complex social forces such as economic disadvan-
tage; institutional and interpersonal discrimination; structural barriers to healthy life
choices, including unequal access to healthy food, education, work, and housing
environments; and disparate access to water and sanitation. However, the most
controversial and perhaps most important contribution to racial and ethnic health
disparities that remains unexplored is the contribution that physicians' implicit biases
make to disproportionately poorer health outcomes for minority patients. The sa-
lient point to take away from the three examples discussed here is how common-
place, pervasive, and disastrously harmful inequality in health care has become. The
next section examines the role that physicians' implicit biases play in creating this
shocking injustice.
1I. IMPLICIT BIAs AND HEALTH CARE DISPARITIES
Modern health care delivery involves a complex network of actors. Physicians
and patients lie at the core of that network and have been the most closely studied
to understand their cognitive attitudes, prejudices, and biases. The first section of
Part 1I reviews the social science of implicit bias generally and the second section
reviews the evidence that physicians' implicit bias is a significant contributor to
health inequality. Both sections contribute information about implicit bias not previ-
ously reported in the legal literature, but important to the task of identifying the type
and timing of interventions most likely to effectively control discrimination due to
implicit biases.
115. See, e.g., Neil Risch et al., Categorization ofHumans in Biomedical Research: Genes, Race, and Disease,
3 GENOME BIOL. 1 (2002). A myriad of scientific research discredits this view, which fatally rests on the
mistaken notion that phenotype is equivalent to genotype. For a lucid exposition of the arguments against this
genetic determinist view, see generally Nancy Krieger, Stormy Weather: Race, Gene Expression, and the Science of
Health Disparities, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2155 (2005) (explaining that (1) self-reported racial categories
describe racial and ethnic features that arise out of gene expression, rather than heritable or innate biological
traits, and (2) the notion that genetic variability accounts for medically important differences in disease
outcomes among racial and ethnic groups depends on the generalized frequency of genetic variants or alleles
underlying the susceptibility of diseases, which occur in fewer than two percent of all diseases).
116. Lisa F. Berkman & Ichiro Kawachi, A Historical Framework for Social Epidemiology, in SOCIAL
EPIDEMIOLOGY 3, 3 (Lisa F. Berkman & I. Kawachi eds., 2000).
117. David R. Williams & Pamela Braboy Jackson, Social Sources of Racial Disparities in Health,
24 HEALTH AFF. 325 (2005).
118. Norman Daniels et al., Why Justice Is Good for Our Health: The Social Determinants of Health
Inequalities, 128 DAEDALUs 215 (1999).
119. See, e.g., George A. Mensah et al., State of Disparities in Cardiovascular Health in the United States,
111 CIRCULATION 1233 (2005).
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A. An Updated Understanding oflmplicit Bias
Consensus has emerged based on twenty-five years of social science research that
implicit biases are pervasive among Americans.120 A bias in this context is a negative
attitude held about one group of people relative to another group. An implicit bias is
a negative association that operates unintentionally or unconsciously to inform judg-
ments and behavior.' 2 ' Implicit biases differ from Se or express biases, which are
deliberately held evaluations that operate with conscious awareness, choice, and
intentionality. Importantly, implicit and explicit biases differ dramatically in the
extent to which they influence behavior. One of the most important revelations
about implicit bias is the extent to which unconscious, implicit attitudes have the
power to override an individual's consciously held, explicit preferences and beliefs.' 2 2
Researchers have repeatedly shown that a person is much more likely to act in
accord with implicit attitudes and prejudices than in alignment with expressly held
viewpoints or personal values.' 2  In other words, unconsciously held racial attitudes
have greater influence over decisions and behavior than consciously held, race-
neutral preferences. No matter how unequivocally and sincerely egalitarian a person
intends to behave, hundreds of thousands of Americans tested have empirically
demonstrated that we are a nation of people who hold strong implicit biases against
members of ethnic and racial minority groups. ' In the case of health care dispari-
ties, this fact has powerful explanatory implications. For example, Dr. Alexander
Green demonstrated that even physicians who expressed virtually no explicit prefer-
ences for white or black patients were nevertheless more likely to give superior
treatment to white patients based on their pro-white implicit biases.' 2 5 Figure 1
below provides a schematic description of how implicit biases form and inform our
perceptions, judgments, and conduct towards people that we identify as belonging to
ethic and racial minority groups. I will use this diagram to provide a basic explana-
tion of how implicit biases work. My explanation is based upon the work of leading
social psychologists that study automatic thought, stereotypes, and implicit atti-
tudes.' 2 6 I have developed this model by collapsing the categories that social scien-
tists use to explain implicit bias, and by using intuitive labels for each step of the
process. Implicit biases operate whether the interaction is between two members of
the same racial group, or between members of different racial groups:
120. Richard R. Banks et al., Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CALIF. L.
REV. 1169 (2006); Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 20, at, 959.
121. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 20, at 951.
122. See, e.g., Andrew Karpinski & James Hilton, Attitudes and the Implicit Association Test, 81 J. PERSON-
ALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 774 (2001) (explaining that implicit and explicit attitudes are independent and
differentially predict behavior); id. at 966 (explaining that implicit bias measures significantly better in
predicting discrimination than explicit bias measures).
123. See, e.g., Laurie A. Rudman and Richard D. Ashmore, Discrimination and the Implicit Association
Test, 10 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 359 (2007).
124. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 20, at 945.
125. Green et al., supra note 7, at 1231.
126. Susan M. Andersen et al., Automatic Thought, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: HANDBOOK OF BASIC PRIN-
CIPLES 138 (Arie W. Kruglanski & E. Tory Higgins eds., 2d ed. 2007).
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Figure 1.
How Implicit Biases Work
Store Identify Retrieve - Activate - Form - Influence
Social Group Group Stereotypes Implicit Judgments,
Knowledge Membership Stereotypes Triggered Biases Decisions,
and Conduct
Implicit biases form based on information subconsciously gathered and stored
during the course of a lifetime. The first step-storing social knowledge-is a process
that takes place wholly outside a person's conscious awareness.' 2 The Environmen-
tal Association Model of implicit bias explains that we all store social knowledge in
memory from everything we see, feel, and experience in the world around us; our
implicit biases reflect the environment and culture that surrounds us, rather than
views we personally endorse.' 2  This explains why an individual may espouse no
overt personal preference for one racial group over another, and yet may hold im-
plicit biases that cause the person to discriminate. I will call the second step in the
implicit bias process "identification." Identification occurs the moment two people
meet. Immediately upon encounter, our minds subconsciously begin to perform a
sorting and contextualizing exercise to make sense of the information received.' 2 1
The task is to find categories from our stored memories to match or fit the newly
encountered individual or situation. When we have found a match, we have identi-
fied the group to which the person we encounter belongs, as well as the category of
stored information that applies to them.' 3 0 Importantly, the identification process
occurs involuntarily and can result in positive or negative associations, depending on
the content of the categories we have stored from the first step. In this second step, we
might categorize a person as male or female, short or tall, fat or skinny, and so on,
without attaching any value judgments whatsoever. In fact, each person and situa-
tion evokes multiple categories during identification. However, studies show that
because Americans live in a race-conscious society, our environment conditions us to
instinctively identify a person's racial or ethnic group as a dominant informational
cue for further processing.
Once we identify the stored categories to which new information belongs, the
process of shaping and responding to our implicit biases begins. Very quickly-fewer
than 500 milliseconds from the moment of identification' 3 2 -we begin the third
step, called "retrieval."'" During retrieval, we subconsciously access the most promi-
nent associations we have stored in memory about that relevant racial or ethnic
127. Id. at 139.
128. Andrew Karpinsi & James Hilton, Attitudes and the Implicit Association Test, 81 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 774,786 (2001).
129. Andersen et al., supra note 126, at 142.
130. Id. at 141.
131. See, e.g., id. at 152.
132. See generally Irene V. Blair & Mahzarin R Banaji, Automatic and Controlled Processes in Stereotype
Priming, 70 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1142 (1996).
133. Andersen et al., supra note 126, at 147.
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group. This process happens without any intentional awareness on our part. Thus,
accessing stored memories happens with "automaticity."' 4 Again, these categorical
associations can be value neutral, such as the ones required to help us live daily in a
complex society. For example, when we cross a street, we automatically retrieve
associations about cars and trucks-that they are fast and dangerous-in order to
cross safely. However, the information we retrieve may also be positive or negative,
and may differ from one person to the next even when we receive the same input or
stimuli. For example, the appearance of a police officer may summons associations of
safety and protection for someone who is a wealthy, white American, but may evoke
associations of danger and fear for a black or Latino male American, regardless of
whether he is wealthy, middle-class, or poor.
The categorical associations we retrieve are called "stereotypes."'5 While stereo-
types are attributes about groups that can be held at a conscious or sub-conscious
level, it is the unconsciously held stereotypes that are activated in the next step
towards forming implicit biases. The activation step simply moves a stereotype from
stored memory to a subconscious place where it becomes accessible for further use.' 3 6
The stereotype becomes available to use in shaping our understanding of the situa-
tion at hand. When negative stereotypes are shaped into a system of beliefs that we
automatically associate with a people group, they form attitudes we call "prejudices."
In the fourth step, automatically activated attitudes become dominant and over-
whelming, displacing even our intentional attitudes and preferences, unless these
subconsciously activated views are deliberately contradicted."' This is the stage at
which we unconsciously form implicit biases. Finally, in the hfth step, implicit biases
work to influence the way we choose to judge and interact with people and situa-
tions.'" Implicit biases may cause people who believe in equality to act discrimi-
natorily.'3 9 And although implicit biases operate at an unconscious level, it does not
necessarily follow that implicit racial biases cannot be influenced or controlled by the
individual or the external environment. Indeed, the best evidence, as we shall see in
Part III, infra, is quite to the contrary.
The tool of choice that both neuroscientists and social psychologists use to mea-
sure unconscious attitudes is called the Implicit Association Test (IAT).1 40 The IAT
is a computer based test that works from the straightforward premise that when
people are asked to associate photographs with words that are consistent with their
134. Blair & Banaji, supra note 132, at 1142.
135. Andersen et al., supra note 126, at 148; Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 20, at 949.
136. Andersen et al., supra note 126, at 148.
137. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 20, at 951; see generally Bertram Gawronski et al., Implicit Bias in
Impression Formation: Associations Influence the Construal of Individuating Information, 33 EUR. J. Soc.
PSYCHOL. 573 (2003).
138. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 20, at 951.
139. Id.
140. The IAT is the most widely accepted, but not the only, tool available to measure implicit bias. Other
methods, including the Go/No-Go Association Task (GNAT), the Lexical Decision Task (LDT), and selec-
tive priming, are discussed later in the Article. See Laurie A. Rudman, The Validity of the Implicit Association
Test is a Scientific Certainty, 1 INDUS. & ORG. PSYCHOL. 426 (2008).
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implicitly held beliefs, they will make those associations quickly.' 4 ' Nhen people are
asked to connect photographs with words they would not naturally or automatically
associate with those photographs, their response times will be slower, to allow them
to override their automatic instincts.' The IAT measures the time a person takes to
associate selected pairs of positive and negative words with pairs of pictures.' 4 3
The IAT has been used extensively to measure implicit attitudes about race using a
version of the test called the Race-Attitude IAT.' 4 4 It measures the time a person
takes to quickly sort photographs of African- and European-American faces, and
combinations of those facial shots with positive and negative adjectives.' 45 The closer
a subject's IAT score is to zero, the more neutral their preferences are between blacks
and whites.' 4 6 A zero score indicates the person taking the test took no more or less
time to associate words with black or white faces.' 4 A high positive IAT score signals
strong, automatic, implicit biases in favor of whites over blacks-a "pro-white" or
"anti-black" bias, whereas a very low or negative IAT score denotes a strong bias in
favor of blacks over whites-a "pro-black" or "anti-white" bias.' 4  Over one million
people have completed the publicly available Race-Attitude IAT to date, and over
seventy percent of them show preference for white Americans over black Americans,
even when their explicit, self-reported values are egalitarian.' 4 9
The IAT specifically, and implicit cognitive psychology generally, have been criti-
cized by some for failing to "satisfy key scientific tests of validity"-internally, statisti-
cally, and externally.'5 o Critics have further asserted the focus on implicit bias is
wrongly placed, both because the IAT itself is ambiguous and because it more likely
measures intentional but covert racial bias rather than unconscious racism."' Other
critics claim that the emphasis on subconscious racism distracts civil rights advocates
from addressing the entrenched and substantively more important sources of ineq-
uity such poverty, poor housing, and inferior education systems.'5 2 Indeed, some of
the most progressive critics have decried the exceptionalism they suspect underlies
implicit bias scholarship.' 53 However, the majority of social scientists have discred-
141. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 20, at 952-956; see a/so Anthony Greenwald et al., Understanding
and using the Implicit Association Test: III. Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 17 (2009)
142. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 20, at 952-956.
143. See generally Brian A. Nosek et al., The Implicit Association Test at Age 7 A Methodological and
Conceptual Review, in AUTOMATIC PROCESSES IN SOCIAL THINKING AND BEHAVIOR 265 (.A. Bargh ed.,
2007).
144. Janice Sabin et al., Physicians'Implicit and Explicit Attitudes About Race by MD Race, Ethnicity, and
Gender, 20 J. Health Care for the Poor & Underserved 896, 899 (2009).
145. Id
146. See id. at 899-900.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. Id. at 897.
150. Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 13, at 1023.
151. See, e.g., id. at 1096 n.236.
152. Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter.- Law,
Politics, and RacialInequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053 (2009).
153. See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Implicit Bias and the Pushback fom the Left, 54 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1139 (2010).
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ited the critiques of the IAT itself,' 4 some likening detractors to an island of dissent
within a sea of consensus based on "a solid empirical bedrock for understanding the
occurrence of implicit bias."' 5 5 Moreover, once unpacked, the leading substantive
critiques rest principally on normative disagreements about whether or not the law
should concern itself with bias that is unconscious and unintentional.' 5 6
I rely principally upon studies that use the IAT to measure implicit attitudes for
four reasons. First, the IAT is the most widely accepted and broadly applied scientific
measure of implicit attitudes available.' 5 Both the volume and variety of contexts in
which social scientists have employed the IAT to measure implicit biases are large
and impressive.' 58 Second, the IAT has survived rigorous peer review, critique, and
rehnements since its introduction in 1998.'5 Greenwald et al., for example, con-
hrmed the IAT's predictive validity for measures of interracial behavior in a meta-
analysis of 122 reports that included 184 independent samples.' 60 Notably, the
meta-analysis showed the IAT effect measures demonstrated particular strength for
socially sensitive topics such as racial and intergroup behavior.' 6 ' Third, an emerging
neuroscience literature showing the correlation between IAT measures and psycho-
physiological reactions to interracial interactions adds scientific support to the useful-
ness and construct validity of this test.' 6 2 Fourth, legal scholars, as well as social
scientists, studying bias in health care have broadly embraced the IAT as a method to
measure unconscious racial and ethnic bias; making the IAT the most appropriate
measure for my discussion of health and health care disparities.
In 1998, Anthony Greenwald and Linda Krieger introduced the idea that anti-
discrimination law should be reformed to reflect information about unconscious
154. The IAT has been the subject of over 450 peer-reviewed publications; its scientific acceptance and
validity is by now, unassailable. See Sabin et al., supra note 144, at 899 ("The IAT has become widely accepted
as a measure of implicit social cognition because it achieves good reliability in comparison [to] other implicit
measures, is relatively robust with repeated assessment for pre-post evaluation, captures evaluations that are
related, but distinct from self-report, and has predictive validity.").
155. John T. Jost etal., The Existence oflmplicit Bias is Beyond Reasonable Doubt:A Refutation ofldeological
and Methodological Objections and Executive Summary of Ten Studies That No Manager Should Ignore, 29 RES.
ORG. BEHAV. 39, 42 (2009).
156. See id. at 42 (" [J]t is rare ... for the huge preponderance of scientists within a well-established
discipline to be utterly and spectacularly wrong. This seems to be what Tetlock and Mitchell are suggesting-
that the near-consensus among social psychologists concerning the discovery of implicit bias reflects some
kind of collective folly or perhaps a hoax or in any case the regrettable result of a blinding ideological
commitment to the doctrine of 'statist interventionism."').
157. Id. at 45-46.
158. Id.; see generally Nosek et al., supra note 143.
159. See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and using the Implicit Association Test: I an
Improved Scoring Algorithm, 85 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 197 (2003); Brian A. Nosek et al.,
Understanding and using the ImplicitAssociation Test: II. Method Variables and Construct Validity, 31 PERSON-
ALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL BULL. 166 (2005); Michael A. Olson & Russell H. Fazio, Reducing the Influence of
ExtrapersonalAssociations on the Implicit Association Test: Personalizing the IAT, 86 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 653 (2004).
160. Anthony G. Greenwald, Understanding and using the Implicit Association Test: III. Meta-Analysis of
Predictive Validity, 17J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 17, 28-32 (2009).
161. Id. at 32.
162. Stanley Damian et al., The Neural Basis oflmplicitAttitudes, 17 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL.
ScI. 164 (2008).
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behavior obtained through widespread use of the Race-Attitude IAT.'6 3 They as-
serted that because the IAT had proved reliable as a scientific measure of unconscious
mental processes and thus provided sufficient basis to alert discriminators of their
conduct, civil rights law should employ the evidence gathered from the test to more
accurately and effectively control prejudice and discrimination.' 6 4 The IAT and its
evidence of implicit bias have formed the basis of the academic movement called
Behavioral Realism, an analytical school of thought unified by its insistence that the
law must reckon with the new, more accurate model of human thought, decision-
making and action that the science of implicit bias reveals.' 6 5 However, it is fair to
say that despite the prominence of its proponents, this movement has not received
the traction legal scholars had hoped from courts and legislatures, which continue to
lag behind in addressing implicit bias discrimination through the law. In this Article,
I aim to highlight new empirical evidence that will compel scholars and jurists to
recognize that the law must become cognizant of discrimination due to implicit
racial and ethnic bias in health care.
B. Physician Implicit Bias: Racism kNew Normal
Racial and ethnic discrimination arising from implicit biases have become the new
normal in American health care. This section reviews the small but powerful body of
empirical literature that demonstrates the impact that implicit biases have through-
out the health care delivery system. I begin with evidence conhrming that the major-
ity of American physicians tested show strong pro-white implicit biases. Next, I
review a representative sample of the groundbreaking evidence that reveal how im-
plicit biases travel from physicians' unintended attitudes to cause racial and ethnic
discrimination to the detriment of minority patients' morbidity and mortality. I
conclude with a word about the causal link between physician implicit bias and the
disparate health outcomes that minority patients suffer.
1. Widespread Physician Bias
Physicians introduce implicit bias into every phase of health care delivery.' 6 6
Using the IAT data collected from hundreds of thousands of voluntary visitors to
Harvard University's Project Implicit interactive website, one study analyzed data
163. See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 20, at 946 (stating that current anti-discrimination law is naive
in assuming that humans act solely in accordance with explicit and conscious intentions).
164. See id.
165. Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law:
Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997 (2006) (introducing Behavioral Realism); see
also Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law oflmplicit Bias, 94 CALIF L. REv. 969 (2006); Jerry Kang &
Kristin Lane, Seeing through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465 (2010); Jerry
Kang & Mahzarin R Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of 'AffirmativeAction," 94 CALIF. L.
REV. 1063 (2006).
166. See Sabin et al., supra note 144, at 906-08. Physicians are not likely to only actors in the health care
industry who hold significant implicit racial and ethnic biases. However, one limitation of the current social
science literature is the dearth of research concerning the impact of bias through other health care providers
including nurses, technical assistants, staff, and health administrators.
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from over 2500 test-takers who self-identified as "MDs."' 6 They then compared the
physicians' IAT data to their self-reported explicit biases, gathered from a question-
naire.'6 8 The study revealed that the physicians tested exhibited the same preferences
for whites over blacks as are seen in the general population.' 6 This study of volun-
teer test-takers may not be representative of all physicians; those who took the IAT
for this study are a self-selected group, and the physicians tested were older and more
racially homogenous than the American population generally.'7 Nevertheless, the
study is revealing because of the size and diversity of the sample group.
This study made two additional noteworthy fndings. First, white male physicians
displayed the strongest pro-white preferences.' ' African-American physicians on
average did not show implicit preference for either white or black Americans, but the
broad standard deviation reported for black MDs indicates that some of these doc-
tors had strong implicit preferences for whites and others had strong implicit prefer-
ences for blacks.' 2 The second revelation from this study relates to the weak
correlation between physicians' explicitly reported racial preferences and their mea-
sured implicit biases. Hispanic and white female physicians reported relatively weak
preferences for whites over blacks, though white male physicians showed slightly
stronger explicit pro-white attitudes.' 7 Both male and female African-Americans
reported explicit attitudes favoring blacks.' Female Hispanic MDs, on average,
reported no explicit race bias whatsoever.' However, it is the relationship- or lack
thereof-between implicit and explicit measures that is most counterintuitive. Al-
though implicit and explicit measures for all those tested were statistically significant,
the two measures were only modestly related.' This disconnect conhrms other data
and supports the understanding that cognitive processes that govern explicit and
implicit attitudes are separate and independent.' This Ending suggests that a per-
son may explicitly hold egalitarian beliefs while simultaneously holding implicitly
biased racial views, or vice-versa. These results become particularly important when
viewed in the context of medical decision-making and health care delivery.
2. Physician Bias Taints Treatment Decisions
In 1999, Dr. Kevin Schulman reported the Erst, path-breaking study of how
patients' race and gender influences physicians' treatment decision-making, leading
to treatment disparities for cardiovascular disease.' 8 This study fundamentally
167. Id. at 899.
168. Id. at 899-902.
169. Id. at 906.
170. Id. at 908.
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changed the conversation about disparities, providing the first concrete evidence that
doctors clinically discriminate against minority patients and therefore may contrib-
ute directly to disparate health outcomes. Dr. Schulman studied 720 primary care
physicians, using a computerized survey to show the doctors videotaped vignettes of
hypothetical patient interviews."' The patients were actually scripted actors who
were selected to appear similar in age and affect.'8 o The eight actors-two each of
white women, white men, black women, and black men-presented identical scripts
and diagnostic data-in each vignette, the patients differed only by race and gen-
der.' 8 After reviewing the vignettes and data, the physicians were asked to make
treatment recommendations.' 8 2 Dr. Schulman analyzed the physician responses by
using a multivariate regression model and found that the patients' race and gender
independently influenced how physicians managed chest pain.'8 3
Dr. Schulman reported that his data showed that white, male patients were signih-
cantly more likely to receive a recommendation for cardiac catheterization than black
and female patients, with a black-white odds ratio of 0.6.184 However, in response to
criticism of his methodology, Dr. Schulman clarified that black female patients were
13% less likely than white males to receive catheterization, and black males were 7%
less likely.'" Taking this correction into account, Schulman concluded "we doubt
that lower utilization rates observed consistently among black patients reflect an
effort to provide more appropriate care to these patients," aptly dismissing those
critics who missed the core message of the study.'8 6 Dr. Schulman's essential fnding
remained disturbingly unshaken: doctors provided black and female patients with
different and inferior medical treatment than they provided to white and male
patients.' 8 However, although Dr. Schulman's study linked considerations of race
and gender to physicians' treatment decisions, it did not attribute those consider-
ations to the physicians' implicitly held biases.' 88
In 2007, Dr. Alexander Green took the next step in a study that examined what
influenced physicians' decisions to recommend thrombolysis for cardiac patients.
The Green study strongly linked physicians' implicit biases to their racially disparate
treatment decisions.' 89 Dr. Green's research team measured physicians' levels of
implicit and explicit race bias by asking them to complete two Implicit Association
Tests and a questionnaire. 90 Next, the doctors were randomly assigned to view a
photograph of either a black or a white actor, while reading a clinical vignette that




183. Id. at 622-23.
184. Id. at 624.
185. See Correspondence: Race, Sex, and Physicians' Referrals for Cardiac Catheterization, 341 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 285, 285-287 (1999).
186. Id. at 287.
187. See id.
188. See generally Schulman et al., supra note 77.
189. Green et al., supra note 7, at 1231.
190. Id. at 1232-33.
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described symptoms potentially linked to coronary artery disease (CAD)."' The
doctors were then asked to rate the likelihood that the patient's chest pain was due to
CAD and to state whether they would prescribe thrombolysis."' The hndings were
remarkable. Dr. Green found an inverse relationship between the level of physicians'
implicit bias and the quality of treatment they gave to minority patients; that is, as
physicians' levels of unconscious race bias increased, the likelihood they would refer
black patients for thrombolysis decreased, while the likelihood they would refer
white patients for thrombolysis increased.'
Green's study replicated the Ending that physicians demonstrated anti-black im-
plicit biases at approximately the same level as the general American population.' 9 4
Moreover, Dr. Green's hndings demonstrated that white physicians tend to hold
implicit racial biases against African-Americans, associating their black patients with
negative attributes, such as being generally uncooperative and medically non-
compliant, even though the physicians show no explicit association between black
patients and negative attributes.1' The study showed a statistical interaction be-
tween physicians' willingness to prescribe thrombolysis and their implicit biases
against blacks generally, and against black patients specifically.' 9 6 Importantly, the
physicians in this study expressed absolutely no explicit racial bias on questionnaires
asking their preferences between black and white patients. In fact, this study showed
no explicit bias in favor of white patients whatsoever.' 9 Thus, the Green study lends
further support to the conclusion that physicians' unconscious beliefs are a more
important determinant of the quality of patient care they give, than what they profess
about their race or ethnicity preferences explicitly. 98
In another part of this study, Dr. Green and his researchers made a crucial fnding
that could prove helpful to policymakers. They separately tested 67 of the physicians
who were made aware that the study's purpose was to evaluate racial bias in medical
decision-making.' 9 9 This group of physicians showed entirely different treatment
recommendation patterns than those who were unaware of the study's objective. The
informed group of doctors showed an increasing willingness to prescribe thromboly-
sis to blacks, even as their IAT scores evincing anti-black, implicit bias, increased.2 0 0
This outcome may reflect a "novelty effect"- evidence that the study participants
self-corrected their biases to improve their outcomes once they were made aware of
the study's focus. However, I propose an alternate view of the difference between
physicians who knew Dr. Green's purpose and those who did not. These findings
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1235.
194. See id. at 123 4 .
195. Id
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1235.
198. See a/so Diana Jill Burgess et al., Patient Race and Physicians'Decisions to Prescribe Opioids for Chronic
Low BackPain, 67 Soc. SC. & MED. 1852,1853 (2008).
199. Green et al., supra note 7, at 1235.
2 0 0. Id.
[Vol. 6:328
HEALTH CARE, TITLE VI, AND RACISM'S NEW NORMAL
reasonably suggest that physicians can recognize, modulate, and even counteract the
effect of their implicit race bias on treatment decisions, at least when they are being
studied. Therefore, it is also reasonable to view this self-correction as positive and
hopeful evidence that physicians generally are willing and able to reverse the impact
of their unconscious racial biases if they are made aware that they have them. In fact,
the majority of physicians studied admitted they thought it likely that implicit racial
biases affect their medical decisions, and their self-awareness increased as the study
went on. Before taking the IATs, 60.5% of physicians agreed with the statement:
"Subconscious biases about patients based on their race may affect the way I make
decisions about their care without my realizing it."2 0 ' After taking the IATs, that
202number increased to 71.6%. Moreover, 74.8% of physicians felt the IATs were
worthwhile, and 76% "felt that learning more about unconscious biases could im-
prove their care of patients." 20' It is reasonable to conclude from this data that the
majority of physicians tested would also be responsive to interventions aimed at
reducing their implicit biases.
The Green study is not without critics. A group of researchers working with both
British and American primary care doctors were unable to replicate Green's Ending
with respect to race bias, but did End that patient gender significantly influenced
physicians' diagnostic decisions.2 04 This same group also made the counterintuitive
claim that social class and patient age had no impact on physician decision-making; if
true, this extraordinary Ending would contradict the extensively supported evidence
of a social gradient in health Erst identified by Sir Michael Marmot in his famous
Whitehall Studies begun in 1967.20) Others have alleged that because the physicians
in Green's study who showed lower IAT scores treated black and white patients
differently, while physicians with higher IAT scores treated black and white patients
similarly, Green should have concluded the IAT does not measure true racial bias.206
This criticism misapprehends Dr. Green's data. His most striking Ending is the
predictive relationship between increasing physician bias and treatment decisions.
The Green study Endings are remarkable because of the interactive relationship
between physicians' clinical choices and measured implicit bias. A physician's likeli-
hood of recommending treatment for black patients is inversely related to the IAT
201. Id.
2 0 2. Id.
203. Id
204. Sara Arber et al., Patient Characteristics and Inequalities in Doctors' Diagnostic and Management
Strategies Relatingto CHD:A Video-Simulation Experiment, 62 Soc. SCI. & MED. 1003 (2006).
205. Id; but cf MICHAEL MARMOT, THE STATUS SYNDROME: How SOCIAL STANDING AFFECTS OUR
HEALTH AND LONGEVITY (2004).
206. See Hal R. Arkes, Prof., Ohio St. U., & Neal V. Dawson, Staff Physician, MetroHealth Medical
Center, Presentation at the Society for Judgment and Decision Making: Race-Based Bias in Physician Deci-
sion Making (Nov. 16, 2008). However, another criticism raised by Arkes and Dawson is legitimate. These
researchers point out that Dr. Green failed to describe criteria for the appropriateness of thrombolysis as a
treatment for African-American patients, especially since racial differences between patients may represent
real epidemiological or clinical differences. Id. Indeed, Dr. Green did not examine the reasons behind
physicians' decisions. Id. Yet this omission has little bearing on the relationship between bias and treatment
that Dr. Green did examine and find. See id.
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score but positively related to IAT scores for white patients. Said another way, the
stronger a physician's pro-white implicit bias, the less likely black patients are to
receive helpful treatment, but the more likely white patients are to get optimal care.
Dr. Green's findings are also remarkable for the lack of correlation between physi-
cians' neutral explicit racial preferences and their treatment decisions, and, in con-
trast, the direct relationship between their implicit racial biases and their treatment
judgments. Taken together, the Schulman and Green studies represent a turning
point in the understanding of whether and how physicians contribute to racial and
ethnic health disparities.
Another pair of studies, conducted by Dr. Janice Sabin and focusing on pediatri-
cians, rehned our understanding of how physicians' implicit biases adversely affect
minority patient health outcomes. In the first study, Sabin's group recruited pediat-
ric faculty, fellows and residents from an urban, research university and administered
three computer based IAT surveys.2 07 The pediatricians were also asked to self-report
their explicit biases, ranking their responses to statements about their feelings to-
wards African- and European- Americans.2 0 s The rankings included their percep-
tions of whether white or black patients are compliant and the doctors' impressions
of who received access to better care.2 09 Then, using case vignettes written for the
study, researchers asked the pediatricians to make treatment recommendations for
four commonly occurring pediatric conditions: Urinary tract infections (UTI), atten-
tion dehcit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), asthma, and post-surgical pain.2 10 The
study presented two patients with each condition-one black and one white.
Each physician participant was randomly assigned a vignette from each disease cat-
egory. Dr. Sabin found that pediatricians generally showed lower implicit prefer-
ences for whites over blacks than most IAT test-takers, and then most other
physicians. 1 3 Moreover, even these lower implicit bias measures were not associated
with any statistically significant differences in the doctors' treatment recommenda-
tions between black and white patients with UTI, ADHD, or asthma.2 1 The study
did End a "moderate implicit association between the concept of 'compliant patient'
and European Americans rather than African Americans, 2 1 5 but another racial End-
ing was counterintuitive, as the physicians studied were more likely to recommend
the recognized treatment of choice- outpatient care-for African-American pa-
tients than for white patients. 1 These conflicting hndings add complexity to the
207. Janice A. Sabin et al., Physician Implicit Attitudes and Stereotypes about Race and Quality ofMedical
Care, 46 MED. CARE 678, 679-80 (2008).
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understanding that implicit biases affect physicians differently based on their special-
ties and the illnesses they are treating.
Drs. Sabin and Greenwald next used an online survey of 86 academic pediatricians
to conduct a second inquiry to determine the correlation between pediatricians'
implicit race biases and their diagnostic decisions for the same four pediatric condi-
tions.2  In the 2012 study, Sabin and Greenwald did End an association between
the doctors' implicit attitudes about race and the treatment recommendations for
their black and white patients, particularly for pain treatment.218 Specifically, the
researchers "found a significant correlation between physician female gender and the
willingness to prescribe a narcotic pain medication for the White patient, but not for
the African American patient." 2 1 9 In both studies, the researchers were able to con-
firm that pediatricians tested have significantly lower implicit biases than other
physicians, and that these biases had differing effects on medical decisions depending
on the patient, the condition being treated, and the socio-demographic factors of the
treating physician.
A group led by Dr. Gordon Moskowitz published a study in 2012 that continued
to explore the connection between physicians' implicit attitudes and their diagnostic
decisions.220 Moskowitz tested physicians' ability to identify medical terms quickly
from a group of randomly generated words appearing on a computer screen.
However, immediately before the selected words appeared, physicians were sublimi-
nally "primed" with a photograph of either an African- or European-American face.
The photograph flashed quickly in the physician's peripheral held of vision so that it
could not be consciously perceived."' The researchers found that physicians were
fastest at identifying medical words for diseases stereotypically associated with African-
Americans after subliminally seeing a black face, but slower identifying the same
medical words after being primed with a white face.2 2 4 Moreover, physicians re-
sponded fastest to terms for conditions that were perceived as arising from behavioral
choices, such as HIV, drug abuse, and obesity, after being primed with black faces.2 2 5
In contrast, physicians were slower to identify terms for medical conditions that were
genetic in origin such as hypertension, stroke, sickle cell anemia, and coronary artery
disease, even though the study showed these diseases are also stereotypically identi-
fied with blacks.2 2 Thus, physicians in Moskowitz's study implicitly associated
certain diseases with African-Americans, without being aware they were doing so.2 2
217. Janice A. Sabin & Anthony G. Greenwald, The Influence ofImplicit Bias on Treatment Recommenda-
tions for 4 Common Pediatric Conditions: Pain, Urinary Tract Infection, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder,
andAsthma, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 988, 989 (2012).
218. Id. at 991-92.
219. Id.
220. Moskowitz et al., supra note 10.
221. Id. at 997-98.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 998.
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Moreover, they were quick to implicitly associate diseases arising from anti-social
behavior with African-Americans. Moskowitz explains the significance of this
fnding:
This is important because (1) it occurred without the doctors realizing they were
invoking stereotypes (or even that they were thinking about African Americans),
suggesting that stereotypes influenced them in ways and at times they did not
consciously intend, and (2) these implicit associations were apparent for both
conditions associated with lifestyle choices and diseases associated with genetic
predisposition. Implicit stereotypical beliefs about African Americans may be
accurate and medically justifiable, and they may equally have no basis in medical
evidence. Our aim was to examine whether implicit stereotyping exists among
medical doctors, because it may bias diagnosis of and treatment recommended
to African American patients even in the absence of intent or awareness by the
practitioner.2 29
By showing the sub-conscious operation of the disease associations, Moskowitz has
pointed out a serious concern. A physician's recollection of stereotype information
associated with a patient's racial or ethnic group, may crowd out the physician's
unbiased assessment and objective treatment decisions about the individual minority
patient in her care.23 o " [E]ven if the stereotype is accurate, the individual's symptoms
may not be best explained by the stereotypical diagnosis . . . [or] implicit assump-
tions may lead to an exaggerated sense of the severity of the symptoms." " This type
of stereotyping, called "statistical discrimination, "232 is particularly dangerous to
minority patients' health outcomes because it gives doctors the comfortable illusion
that their practice decisions are evidence-based, when in fact they are based on
unconsciously racist presumptions.
3. Implicit Bias Affects Other Health Providers
In 2011, a group led by Adil Haider published a study involving first-year medical
students at Johns Hopkins Medical School.23 3 Haider found that the majority of
doctors-in-training hold similar implicit preferences for whites as compared to blacks,
and for wealthier individuals as compared to those from lower socio-economic
groups.23 4 These results are consistent with those found among their more senior
physician colleagues and among Americans overall.23  However, Haider generally
found no association between the medical students' IAT scores and their clinical
228. See id.
229. Id. at 1000.
230. See id.
231. Id
232. See generally Balsa & McGuire, supra note 89.
233. Adil H. Haider et al., Association of Unconscious Race and Social Class Bias with Vignette-Based Clinical
Assessments by Medical Students, 306 JAMA 942 (2011).
234. Id. at 9
4
5.
235. See supra Part II.B.
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assessments based on patient vignettes.23 Students viewed three patient vignettes
and then took a multiple-choice questionnaire to test their medical judgment across
four scenarios.23  The scenarios required a pain assessment, a determination of the
appropriateness of informed consent, and assessments of patient reliability and
trust.23 The vignettes were selected to randomly show students patients of different
races-black and white-and patients of different socioeconomic classes. In two of
the three vignettes, there was no connection between medical student implicit biases
and their medical judgments.23 9 The students' racial biases correlated with differ-
ences in their assessments of patients only in the vignette involved in assessing a
patient's informed consent. 240 In all other scenarios, the students' responses did not
vary with the patient's race or socio-economic status, notwithstanding evidence these
students held similar implicit biases to more senior physicians and residents in other
studies.
One commenter explained the difference between student biases and patient care
by pointing to the focused attention they were able to give the patient assessment task
as compared to the practice settings where older physicians are tired, anxious, stressed,
and carrying high cognitive loads. However, this explanation does not accommo-
date the laboratory studies in which more senior physicians' implicit biases affected
their patient judgments even when they responded in controlled, focused, low-
cognitive load, research environments. In fact, Haider's study more plausibly raises
important questions about whether some aspect ofAmerican medical training contrib-
utes to the increased likelihood that younger physicians' biases will influence their
medical decision-making. Another study provides empirical evidence to shed light
on this possibility.
Dr. Shelley White-Means studied implicit and explicit race and skin-tone bias
among pre-professional medical, nursing, and pharmacy students at southern U.S.
colleges. 2 43 This longitudinal study followed students over three years, but the same
students were not followed through the entire study. 4 Researchers administered
two IATs-the Race-Attitude IAT, and an IAT measuring skin tone preferences-
annually during the study.245 Four findings are noteworthy. First, pre-professional
students exhibited significantly higher levels of pro-white bias than test takers in the
nation as a whole.2 46 Remarkably, 94% of non-Hispanic Whites, 100% of Hispan-
ics, 76% of Asians, and 64% of black students tested revealed statistically significant
236. Haider et al., supra note 233, at 945.
237. Id. at 943-44.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 945-946.
240. Id. at 946.
241. Id. at 947.
242. Michelle van Ryn & Somantha Saha, Exploring Unconscious Bias in Disparities Research and Medical
Education, 306 JAMA 995, 995 (2011).
243. White-Means et al., supra note 88, at 4 3 9.
244. Id. at 439-40. Technically, because this study did not follow the same students over the three-year
period, it is a cross-sectional, rather than longitudinal, study.
245. Id. at 440-41.
246. Id. at 447.
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unconscious preferences for whites over blacks.2 Interestingly, some mean race
IAT scores varied by professional school and race of the respondents. For example,
third- and fourth-year black pharmacy students indicated an implicit preference for
blacks, and Asian medical students exhibited the strongest preference for light over
dark skin tones. 48 Second, the students' implicit bias scores were negatively corre-
lated with their self-reported levels of cultural competency. Thus, these health
profession students conhdently believed themselves to be effective communicators in
cross-cultural situations, despite their IAT scores to the contrary. Third, students'
race bias did not change significantly across the three graduate years; however, a
slight increase in pro-white bias among older medical students may have reached
statistical significance if more third- and fourth-year medical students had partici-
pated in the study."' Finally, the study found a correlation between students' socio-
economic status and their implicit bias scores. 5 ' The participants' implicit race bias
scores were significantly lower when students reported their backgrounds included
personal experience with economic deprivation.2 5 2 In summary, the White-Means
study lays the foundation for further exploration of the differences in racial and
ethnic and racial bias across the health professions, and of the impact that medical
education has on health providers' implicit attitudes.
4. Physician Biases Affect Patient Communication and Post-Clinical Adherence
Implicit bias has an impact beyond the physician's clinical decisions. Bias also
affects the interaction and communication physicians have with their patients, as
well as their patients' responses to these clinical encounters.2 5 ' Dr. Lisa Cooper
studied 40 primary care physicians and over 260 of their patients to determine
the influence that physicians' implicit biases may have on patients. 2 5 4 After audio-
taping clinical office visits, Dr. Cooper administered a survey to patients following
the doctor's meeting, and two IATs, to the physicians. 5 Using linear and logistic
regression analysis, Dr. Cooper identified two important influences. First, Dr. Cooper
found that greater physician bias was associated disparate communication styles and
content.2 5 6 Physicians with higher IAT (pro-white) scores had longer, slower conver-
sations with black patients, in which the doctors were more verbally dominant.2 5
Physicians with higher IAT scores had shorter, more rapid dialogue with white
patients, in which the physician was less verbally dominant and presented a more
247. Id. The location of this university study in the nation's Southern Delta region may explain this
outcome.
248. Id. at 450.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 447.
251. Id. at 453.
252. Id.
253. Lisa A. Cooper et al., The Associations of Clinicians'Implicit Attitudes about Race with Medical Visit
Communication and Patient Ratings oflnterpersonal Care, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 979, 981 (2012).
254. Id. at 979.
255. Id. at 979-80.
256. Id. at 980-81.
257. Id. at 980.
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positive affect.2 5 " Higher IAT scores were also associated with less patient-centered
communication content with black patients than with white.2 59 Dr. Cooper's second
hnding conhrmed an association between high physician IAT levels and negative
patient ratings of trust and conhdence in the clinician for black patients, but largely
positive patient ratings for white patients.260 While the communication differences
these researchers observed may be subject to different interpretations, the patient
responses to implicitly biased physicians were clearly negative for black patients, and
generally positive for whites.2 6' Dr. Cooper points out that greater patient trust is
empirically associated with patient adherence and continuity of care, underscoring
the harm that poor physician-patient communication will likely have on minority
patients' health outcomes.26 2
In 2010, a group of social psychologists led by Dr. Louis Penner further examined
the responses that minority patients may have to implicit biased physicians.26 ' These
researchers used the term "aversive racism" to explore how implicit and explicit racial
bias interact during the communication exchange between physicians and their minor-
ity patients. 6 An aversive racist describes the individual whose implicit and explicit
bias measures present a contradiction; they score very low on explicit bias measures,
but very high on implicit bias tests.2 6 5 Not only does the aversive racist deny ex-
pressly racist views-in fact, this person explicitly and perhaps even emphatically
disapproves of racial bias in others. At the same time, this person also unconsciously
holds attitudes informed by racial prejudice and stereotypes.
Penner's group examined the effects of implicit and explicit bias on physician-
patient relationships in a study of hfteen primary care physicians and one-hundred
hfty of their African-American patients at an inner city clinic.2 6 6 The study evaluated
the level of teamwork and cooperation black patients felt with doctors who demon-
strated high anti-black implicit bias on their IATs.26 Penner's Endings are trou-
bling. African-American patients in this study reacted most negatively towards
physicians who met the criteria for an aversive racist, relative to all other combina-
tions of implicit and explicit physician bias.2 6 " According to Penner, African-
Americans trust these physicians least of all physicians, perceiving a lack of trust,
258. Id. at 981.
259. Id
260. Id. at 983.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Louis A. Penner et al., Aversive Racism and Medical Interactions with Black Patients: A Field Study,
46 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 436 (2010).
264. Id. at 436.
265. Id. at 437.
266. Id. The physicians Dr. Penner studied were almost all non-black, foreign trained doctors, a typical
demographic profile for inner city providers who serve poor communities of color. Id. This lack of diversity
among physicians was a limitation of the study. See id. Also, because the participants in Penner's study were
volunteers, not randomly selected, they were not a representative sample of the health care provider or patient
community. Id.
267. Id. at 436-37.
268. Id. at 439.
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friendliness, and teamwork in their relationships." Together, the Cooper and Penner
studies reasonably point to the disconcerting expectation that black patients are
unlikely to accept medical advice, adhere to treatment regimes, or schedule and
attend follow-up visits with implicitly biased physicians, especially if those doctors
profess low explicit racial and ethnic biases.
The Schulman, Green, and Sabin studies lay a strong foundation for understand-
ing how physicians' implicit racial biases lead to disparate medical treatment and
health outcomes. Dr. Schulman identified race and gender as influences that affect
physicians' treatment decisions, while Dr. Green provided evidence showing the
correlation between doctors' unconscious racial biases and their treatment de-
cisions. Notwithstanding the cautionary note sounded by Dr. Arber's non-Endings,
the link between unconscious racism and disparate treatment cannot be ignored.
Dr. Sabin's study refines this correlation, showing that biases and their impacts will
vary with different types of physicians, maladies, and patient groups. The Haider and
White-Means studies add another nuance to suggest the strong influences that biases
have over communication as well as medical decision making during the course of
medical training, and Drs. Cooper and Penner point to the substantial impact that
doctors' aversive racism may have on minority patients' trust, confidence, and adher-
ence to treatment regimens during and after the clinical visit. The results from
Dr. Moskowitz's study show how bias can lead to erroneous statistical judgments and
compromise the quality of care a doctor provides to an individual minority patient
who does not fit the generalizable data. The picture of harm that emerges from these
data is serious and has been tolerated for far too long. The data that follow provide
the necessary basis for principled application of anti-discrimination law to radically
shift the paradigm that, to date, has tolerated disparities due to unconscious discrimi-
nation in health care.
5. Physician Implicit Biases Contribute To Health Disparities
The evidentiary record reviewed in this section demonstrates that physicians'
implicit biases cause inferior health outcomes, and thereby contribute to racial and
ethnic health disparities. Physicians' implicit biases enter the examination room,
clinical office, and even the operating room. Implicit biases distort physicians' inter-
pretation of objective patient data and information. As a result, physicians uninten-
tionally provide inferior treatment to minority patients, and minority patients
consequently suffer inferior health outcomes. Moreover, implicit biases influence
physicians to provide inferior health information to minority patients, exacerbating
those disparate health outcomes. Finally, physicians who hold high pro-white biases
communicate less effectively with minority patients, and minority patients respond
in kind. Especially where the physicians are characterized by high measures of im-
plicit bias accompanied by low explicit bias, minority patients perceive unintentional
racism, which inhibits their adherence and care seeking. Dr. John Dovidio explains
that taken together, these disparities in diagnosis, treatment, and patient communica-
269. Id.
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tion affect "patient recall of medical information, treatment adherence, patient satis-
faction, and health outcomes." 2 0 Together with some of the nation's leading health
and health care social scientists, Dovidio plainly asserted a the causal link between
physician implicit bias and health disparities stating,
We believe, however, that sufficient data do exist to conclude that subtle racism is a
significant contributor to health care disparities .... We acknowledge that health
care disparities may be caused by a variety of factors, including system level factors,
outside of medical interactions. Nevertheless, we contend that efforts to reduce the
impact of prejudice and stereotyping in patient-provider interactions can help to
reduce racial disparities in health by improving the quality of care for racial and
ethnic minority groups. Indeed, studies have shown that when treatment dispari-
ties are eliminated, disparities in health outcomes are substantially attenuated or
absent.
Having established the causal connection between physicians' implicit bias and minor-
ity patients' poor health outcomes, the next step is to determine what can be done to
eliminate diagnosis, treatment and communication disparities. The next section
introduces a crucial body of social science research that has garnered very little
attention in the legal literature. I believe the evidence that physician implicit biases
are malleable-subject to deliberate control and influence-is the essential missing
piece of the puzzle that will allow law- and policy-makers to act to eradicate the
ubiquitous influence of unconscious discrimination in health care.
III. MALLEABILITY
Over the past quarter century, social scientists have amassed a copious body of
empirical research documenting the evidence that Americans overwhelmingly and
subconsciously hold negative stereotypes about blacks and other minorities. The
empirical evidence moreover confirms that though these implicit attitudes are uncon-
sciously held, they powerfully direct judgments and conduct so that most Americans
act in accord with their implicit biases, even if these attitudes are directly contrary to
their expressly egalitarian views on race.2 " The evidence that implicit biases are
associated with harmful discrimination is overwhelming. Yet, convincing calls for
legal reform to address modern forms of racial discrimination have gone largely
unheeded.2  I believe this lack of legal uptake is because most legal literature as-
sumes that discrimination due to implicit biases operates automatically, and that
without intent or conscious awareness, such bias is also unavoidable, intractable, and
beyond conscious control. None of these assumptions are correct.
270. John F. Dovidio et al., Disparities and Distrust: The Implications ofPsychologicalProcesses for Understand-
ing Racial Disparities in Health and Health Care, 67 Soc. Scl. & MED. 478, 482 (2008).
271. Id. at 
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273. Id.
274. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 20.
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The prevailing narrative about unconscious racism wrongly assumes its inevitabil-
ity. Thus, when confronted with academic proposals to make law responsive to
serious harms caused by implicit bias, jurists have stumbled over their understanding
that the discrimination, no matter how deadly or unjust, is outside the control of the
discriminators; they have struggled with the idea of holding one responsible for
actions they do not intend to commit or injuries they did not intend to cause.
Perhaps the truth concerning implicit biases' susceptibility to intentional external
and internal influences has been ignored because it challenges a comfortable absolu-
tionist narrative that permits courts and others to wink at the fact that implicit biases
produce the most virulent and complex forms of racial discrimination. The scientific
evidence of malleability should result in no less than an upheaval in this compla-
cency. The next section of this Article introduces the empirical evidence that uncon-
scious racism, though ubiquitous, is neither inaccessible nor uncontrollable, and its
influences are not inescapable.
A. Empirical Evidence ofMalleability
Social scientists have been developing the body of empirical evidence that shows
implicit biases are malleable for more than two decades."' The empirical record now
offers strong evidence that implicit attitudes are neither inaccessible nor inescapable;
they are not impossible to control, and they are not out of reach. Implicit associations
can be influenced both by the individual who unconsciously holds these stereotypes
and prejudices, and by external influences. Researchers have reported and reviewed
between forty 6 and hfty7 studies that demonstrate unconscious implicit attitudes
are responsive to deliberate individual choices, to external changes in environment,
and to the general social acceptability of the stereotype or prejudice. Although im-
plicit biases evolve from social knowledge acquired slowly and over a lifetime, they
are not impervious to change. The evidence reveals that learning can continue to take
place and alter social knowledge even after initial attitudes and associations are
formed. Just as one may have subconsciously incorporated bad habits into driving
behavior over many years, yet alter those driving habits later on, so one may alter his
or her implicit biases. Driving may improve when a person chooses to pay attention,
either of their own accord or because of external influences-say, new rules of the
road, prosecution for reckless driving, or attending a driver's education class. Implicit
biases can change for similar reasons. Thus, malleability describes an ongoing learn-
ing process in which people with old, objectionable implicit biases can learn to
275. See Daniel T. Gilbert & J. Gregory Hixon, The Trouble of Thinking: Activation and Application of
Stereotypic Belief, 60 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 509 (1991) (comparing the effect of cognitive
busyness introduced before and after stereotype activation on Asian stereotypes); see also C. Neil Macrae et al.,
Stereotypes as Energy-saving Devices: A Peek Inside the Cognitive Toolbox, 66 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
37 (1994) (including a seminal experiment introducing the "ironic effect" that skinhead stereotypes strength-
ened following suppression).
276. Nilanjana Dasgupta & Shaki Asgari, SeeingIs Believing: Exposure to Counter stereotypic Women Leaders
and it Effect on the Malleability ofAutomatic Gender Stereotyping, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 642,
643 (2004).
277. Blair, supra note 14, at 244.
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respond to newer, more appropriate attitudes and beliefs. Put another way, long-
standing and unconscious thinking and behavior can change.
This understanding of malleability is called the "connectionist" model of implicit
bias." 8 Unlike the prior notion that implicit associations were static and inaccessibly
fixed "things," the empirical record reveals that stereotypes and prejudicial beliefs to
which we may adhere at any given time are "states" of thinking that form based on
past experiences and inputs, but that may be revised depending upon current informa-
tional inputs gathered and weighed with each new encounter. This flexible view of
stereotyping replaces an outdated, rigid view, and allows for the evidence that indi-
viduals can constantly update the stored knowledge that produces implicit biases.
Psychologists explain that "stereotypes are quite elastic and, thus, any individual
could hold an inhnite number of representations of social category's members, when
viewed across time and place." 2  In other words, "a stereotype is a pattern of activa-
tion that, at a given point in time, is jointly determined by current input (i.e., the
context) and the . . . weight[]" of the new information's connection to existing and
underlying beliefs. 2 0
Early demonstrations of implicit biases focused on their automaticity-the fact
that individuals made associations from stored knowledge to present day people and
situations without any awareness that these associations were being made, much less
that the associations were responsible for directing their conscious conduct and
choices. Researchers formerly concluded that automaticity meant inevitability, report-
ing that "[a] crucial component of automatic processes is their inescapability; they
occur despite deliberate attempts to bypass or ignore them." ,21 However, for more
than two decades, researchers have collected a strong record to contradict the early
understanding. These views have been replaced by what one social scientist has called
"the now-bountiful evidence that automatic attitudes-like self-reported attitudes-
are sensitive to personal, social, and situational pressures."28 2 Further, "[t]he conclu-
sion that automatic stereotypes and prejudice are not as inflexible as previously
assumed is strengthened by the number and variety of demonstrations (nearly 50 in
all), the fact that the tests were conducted in the service of many different goals, and
by the similarity of Endings across different measures. "283
The importance of this understanding of malleability to anti-discrimination ef-
forts cannot be overstated. First, it demonstrates that interventions may be strategi-
cally introduced to alter implicit biases, and we can now say that implicit biases and
their resulting discrimination may be reduced. When referring to the ability to
"reduce" implicit biases or stereotypes, I mean that current inputs can be adjusted so
that the resulting stereotype patterns no longer conform to traditional discriminatory
278. Andersen et al., supra note 126, at 142.
279. Alison P. Lenton et al., A Meta-Analysis on the Malleability ofAutomatic Gender Stereotypes, 33 PSY-
CHOL. OF WOMEN Q. 183,184 (2008).
280. See id.
281. Devine, supra note 15, at 6.
282. Blair, supra note 14, at 256.
283. Id. at 254.
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or inequitable stereotypes, but instead lead to more equitable judgments and con-
duct. Furthermore, the research underlying the connectionist model has also pro-
vided important insights concerning several intervention methods available to
individuals and institutions wishing to mediate the discriminatory impact of deci-
sions and conduct informed by implicit biases. Finally, by demonstrating that even
automatic and subconscious biases are within reach and control, researchers have
provided a sound basis for holding individuals and institutions responsible for reduc-
ing the discriminatory impact of implicit biases.
B. Evidence that Interventions Reduce Implicit Biases
The social science literature includes several studies of a wide variety of interven-
tion strategies that have been tested for their efficacy in reducing implicit biases.
Borrowing from the work of sociologists, I organize the interventions shown to be
most effective and that have the clearest practical application into three categories
that I call "Type A," "Type B," and "Type C" interventions, based on the timing of
each intervention. Figure 2 demonstrates when each intervention occurs during the
cognitive process.
Figure 2.
Three Types of Interventions to Reduce the Impact of Implicit Bias
Type A Type B Type C
Intervention Intervention Intervention
Store Identify Retrieve Activate - Form - Influence
Social Group Group Stereotypes Implicit Judgments,
Knowledge Membership Stereotypes Triggered Biases Decisions,
and Conduct
Type A methods reduce implicit biases by intervening before stereotypes are sub-
consciously activated. This category includes distraction methods aimed at increas-
ing the cognitive busyness a person experiences so that the encounter with stimuli
that invokes automatic negative stereotypes is less direct and prolonged. Type A also
includes a priori training that seeks to negate stereotype activation. This is the most
effective of the Type A interventions discussed in the social science literature. Type B
interventions are introduced after stereotypes are activated, but before implicit biases
are formed. This second method depends on heterogeneity within the activated
automatic stereotype in order to contradict the older learned patterns of categoriza-
tion, with newer, contradictory examples. Type C interventions describe methods
introduced after implicit biases are formed but before the biases influence judgments
and behavior. Suppression campaigns, such as a "Just Say No" approach, fall into this
category, and are notoriously ineffective. However, other Type C methods that alter
individual and social motivations do work to reduce the discriminatory impact of
284. See supra Part II.A.
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implicit biases. I next review sample experiments that demonstrate how each type of
intervention works.
1. Type A Intervention: Stereotype Negation Training
Researchers have demonstrated that stereotype negation training can significantly
reduce the automatic activation of stereotypes. As early as 1989, psychologist
Patricia Devine performed a series of three studies that demonstrated that automatic
racial stereotypes and prejudices against blacks could be controlled and ultimately
changed by an individual's willingness to invest the "intention, attention, and
time. 2 8 5 Dr. Devine demonstrated that negation training could effectively inhibit
automatically activated attitudes and beliefs, and replace them with non-prejudiced
ideas and responses. 8 Her explanation of the change process succinctly describes
the premise underlying stereotype negation training:
Inhibiting stereotype-congruent or prejudice-like responses and intentionally replac-
ing them with non-prejudiced responses can be likened to the breaking of a bad
habit. That is, automatic stereotype activation functions in much the same way as a
bad habit. Its consequences are spontaneous and undesirable, at least for the low-
prejudice person .... [Ellimination of a bad habit requires essentially the same
steps as the formation of a habit. The individual must (a) initially decide to stop the
old behavior, (b) remember the resolution, and (c) try repeatedly and decide
repeatedly to eliminate the habit before the habit can be eliminated. In addition,
the individual must develop a new cognitive (attitudinal and belief) structure that
is consistent with the newly determined pattern of responses.
Devine's description of the methodological principles that make stereotype
negation training effective distinguishes this training from cultural competency pro-
grams currently in use throughout the American health care system."1 Cultural
Competency programs typically provide episodic exposure to factual information
about health disparities and minority communities.28 9 These curricula encourage
"colorblindness" or suppression of anti-group attitudes in order to achieve equality
of care, and often can have a disappointing "rebound" effect, making prejudice more,
285. Devine, supra note 15, at 16 (finding that low-prejudice individuals chose non-prejudiced thoughts
to record, in contradiction to a list of stereotypes about Blacks they had earlier generated).
286. See id.
287. Id. at 15.
288. See, e.g., Joseph R. Betancourt et al., Cultural Competence and Health Care Disparities: Key Perspectives
and Trends, 24 HEALTH AFF. 499 (2005).
289. See, e.g., Office of Minority Health, A Physician's Practical Guide to Culturally Competent Care,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://cccm.thinkculturalhealth.hhs.gov/ (last visited Feb. 14,
2013). This is a website that offers several certificate courses for health care providers to learn cultural
competency. It provides an interactive online course that took me approximately 2 hours to complete. It
contained important and accurate data about health disparities, case studies followed by "self-exploration"
questions that ask the responder's feelings, and aspirational goals for "respectful" and "equitable" care. See id.
The training includes no mention or address of implicit biases or automatic stereotypes, prejudices, beliefs, or
attitudes of any kind. See id.
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rather than less, likely.2"o Such methods are aimed primarily at affecting explicit,
rather than implicit, biases and prejudices. As a result, the effectiveness of cultural
competency programs has been mixed, at best.2 9' Stereotype negation aims instead
to remove and replace automatic, implicit, subconscious attitudes and beliefs
through repeated exposure to new structural models of association. Studies show
this method works to reduce and replace implicit biases.29' One group of social
scientists conducted a series of experiments in which participants were asked to
associate stereotype words with images of skinheads and African-Americans before
and after negation training. 294 These researchers theorized that just as negative stereo-
types are learned through repeated exposure, introducing repeated training to de-
nounce stereotypes and replace old automatic attitudes with newly learned ones
could reduce automatic activation of negative stereotype traits.2 9 ' It worked: partici-
pants in their studies who received extensive stereotype negation training were able to
reduce stereotype activation and the reduced effect was still clearly visible 24 hours
following the training session.296 "[T] these findings provide support for the assump-
tion that with instruction and repetition, individuals can become adept at respond-
ing negatively to stereotypes. In short, practice does make perfect-or at least very
good-stereotype negators. "29
A later study demonstrated similarly effective outcomes using live student partici-
pants. This study involved two quasi-experiments that followed college students
enrolled in a prejudice and conflict seminar.298 Control group students were enrolled
in a research methods class.299 The researchers used the IAT to measure implicit
preferences, as well as the Lexical Decision Task (LDT) test, to measure automatic
stereotypes.-oo The researchers measured students' implicit biases twice: at the begin-
290. See, e.g., Laurie A. Rudman et al., "Unlearning"Automatic Biases: The Malleability ofImplicit Prejudice
and Stereotypes, 81 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 856, 857 (2001); see also Daniel M. Wenger, Ironic
Processes ofMental Control, 101 PSYCHOL. REV. 34(1994).
291. Desiree A. Lie et al., Does Cultural Competency Training ofHealth Professionals Improve Patient
Outcomes? A Systematic Review and Proposed Algorithm for Future Research, 26 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 317
(2010).
292. See Kerry Kawakami et al., Just Say No (to Stereotyping): Effects ofTraining in the Negation ofStereotype
Association on Stereotype Activation, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 871, 871-72 (2000).
293. See id.
294. See id. at 872-73.
295. See id.
296. Id. at 884.
297. Id.
298. Rudman et al., supra note 290, at 858.These studies were quasi-experiments because participants
were volunteers, and therefore were not randomly selected or assigned.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 862. The Lexical Decision Task ("LDT") "is one in which a subject must simply look at a string
of letters and decide whether it is a meaningful word." Samuel L. Gaertner & John P. McLaughlin, Racial
Stereotypes: Associations and Ascriptions ofPositive and Negative Characteristics, 46 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 23, 23
(19 8 3 ). Researchers have found that when two strings are presented simultaneously and subjects must make a
single decision about the pair (i.e., both are meaningful, or both are not meaningful,), the "reaction time of
the decision [is] reliably faster ... than when the strings [are] unassociated words." See id. at 23-24. The LDT
in the study at issue was designed "to examine whether particular words are recognized faster than other words
when preceded by a prime." Rudman et al., supra note 290, at 862. Subjects were exposed to a "prime" word
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ning of the semester and at the end of the semester.3 o' During the semester, the
students underwent stereotype negation training, including: (1) journaling exercises
that required students to document and discuss their own biases, motivations for
bias, and ways to counteract their biases, (2) pro-social contact with members of
other racial and ethnic groups, including an African-American male professor, and
(3) discussion that focused on personal views and experiences, which sometimes
resulted in heated exchanges among students, but allowed them to encounter, share,
and process personalized experiences, as well as information about prejudice. 0 2 The
researchers found that training significantly reduced both implicit and explicit anti-
black biases-at the end of the two experiments, students in the prejudice and
conflict seminar showed significantly lower implicit and explicit anti-black biases, as
compared to control group students. 03 Although this sample of the leading studies
on stereotype negation training is admittedly not exhaustive, it does demonstrate
that social science research supports the conclusion that individuals who exhibit
"'automatic," implicit racial biases and prejudices can be trained to think and behave
differently.
2. Type B Intervention: Promoting Counter-Stereotypes
Increasing the accessibility of counter-stereotypes decreases automatic negative
stereotype associations. 0 4 In one study, researchers repeatedly showed participants
photographic images of famous and admired blacks such as Martin Luther King or
Denzel Washington, and photographs of infamous and disliked Whites, such as
Charles Manson, to achieve significant reductions in automatic preferences. 05 The
researchers in this study concluded with the observation that while exposure to
admired and disliked group member produced substantial changes in automatic,
implicit attitudes, the evidence suggested little change in explicit biases.3 ' These
are useful findings that have been replicated by other scientists studying race,so0
gender,3 0 8 and age' 0 9 implicit biases. Although the application for the studies dis-
cussed in this Article relates to race and ethnicity bias, the evidence that Type B
interventions work to counter other stereotypes is instructive. Indeed, the practical
importance of this counter-stereotype research becomes most plainly apparent when
(either "BLACKS," "WHITES," or "XYZX") for fifteen milliseconds before the target word was displayed. Id.
Higher scores on the LDT indicated "greater facilitation for recognizing negative Black words (e.g., lazy)
when primed with BLACKS versus WHITES, and greater facilitation for recognizing positive White words
(e.g., ambitious) when primed with WHITES versus BLACKS." Id.
301. Id. at 862.
302. Id. at 859-65.
303. Id. at 865.
304. Dasgupta & Greenwald, supra note 16.
305. Id. at 802-05, 811.
306. Id. at 808.
307. See Rudman et al., supra note 290, at 861.
308. See Irene V. Blair et al., Imagining Stereotypes Away: The Moderation ofImplicit Stereotypes Through
MentalImagery, 81 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 828 (2001) [hereinafter Blair etal., Imagining].
309. See Claire Cullen et al., The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) and the Malleability of
AgeistAttitudes, 49 THE PSYCHOL. REC. 591 (2009).
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the experiments move from controlled laboratory settings, into actual "real life" field
settings.
In a longitudinal study of the impact that counter-stereotypes have on gender
biases, researchers tested whether exposure to women in positions of leadership on a
college campus changed female students' implicit gender biases.31 o One of the two
experiments in this series was conducted in a laboratory, while the other took place
on the campuses of coeducational and women's colleges."' In the first study, female
participants were exposed to biographies and photographs of high profile women in
leadership positions. 1 2 Women in a control group were shown descriptions and
pictures of a variety of flowers."' The participants then completed gender-IATs to
measure their implicit biases.3 1 4 The study showed that exposure to admired mem-
bers of a disadvantaged group-women-positively affected automatic attitudes and
beliefs about members of that social group.' In the second study, fifty-two college
students from two campuses were asked to complete identical gender-IAT studies.3 1 6
These participants were also asked to describe their course load, extracurricular
activities, and role models on campus.3 1 In contrast to the group in the first study,
the researchers sought to discover the effects of exposure to counter-stereotypes in
the students' everyday lives."' Women occupied leadership and counter-stereotypi-
cal positions-such as deans, math and science professors, and college presidents-at
the all-women's college more frequently than they did at the co-educational school."'
The students were followed a year after their initial study to see how their stereotypes
and prejudices had changed.3 20 At the end of both studies, the scientists concluded:
"Both the laboratory study and the field study reported in this paper converge on the
same message-women's automatic stereotypic beliefs about their ingroup can be
undermined if they inhabit local environments in which women frequently occupy
counter-stereotypic leadership roles."3 2 The findings with respect to environmental
cues were especially important, as the researchers found that academic environments
that exposed students to female leaders not only reduced automatic stereotype beliefs
about women, but also showed a long term, positive effect that increased over time,
"underscor[ing] the power of local environments in shaping women's nonconscious
beliefs about their ingroup." 2 2 In addition, these gender-bias studies replicate results
310. Dasgupta & Asgari, supra note 276, at 642.
311. Id
312. Id. at 64 5-47.
313. Id
314. Id.
315. Id. at 648.
316. Id. at 64 9-50.
317. Id
318. Seeid.at651.
319. See id. at 645.
320. Id. at 650.
321. Id. at 654.
322. Id. at 642.
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seen in other controlled laboratory settings demonstrating the malleability of im-
plicit race-bias.3 2 3
In another approach to presenting counter-stereotypes, researchers have found
that both still and video images work to reduce implicit biases.3 ' Photographs of an
admired black, elderly, or female subject or videos showing counter-stereotypic condi-
tions can effectively reduce automatic stereotyping.-2 5 In one study, some partici-
pants watched a short video of African-Americans enjoying a family barbecue or
attending church, while other participants saw videos of blacks in gang-violence
scenes.3 2 6 Participants who had watched the first videos demonstrated significantly
lower implicit preferences for whites when compared to participants who had watched
a video of blacks engaged in anti-social stereotypical activities. 2 ' Researchers con-
cluded these experiments demonstrated that automatic group biases and stereotypes,
"commonly thought to be fixed and invariant, are in fact sensitive to changes in the
situational context."3 28
The next series of experiments are remarkable, because they show that individuals
can reduce their implicit biases by what they choose to think.' 2 "Imagining" is a
variant on the use of counter-stereotypes based on an individual's ability to think up
their own counter-stereotype images. 3 o Dr. Irene Blair performed live experi-
ments to test whether an individual who focuses attention on creating a counter-
stereotypical mental image of a strong and capable woman can effectively reduce
their own access to automatic stereotypes and alter the implicit associations that
direct judgment and behavior toward women.3 '" In three of the live experiments,
researchers asked undergraduate students to spend several minutes imagining what a
strong women is like, including her hobbies, what she is competent at doing, and
other features that came to mind. 3 2 The students reported that they had no diffi-
culty developing mental images of counter-stereotypes, which included a business-
woman, an athlete, a warrior, or simply a woman who balanced family, career, and
friends well.' 3 A control group was asked to spend the time thinking about neutral
images, such as a Caribbean vacation. 3 4 Participants then took gender-IATs to
measure the speed of their associations with words and pictures that contradicted
stereotypes about women (e.g., strong, leader, muscular, in charge) and with words
323. See, e.g., Blair, supra note 14.
324. Bernd Wittenbrink et al., Spontaneous Prejudice in Context: Variability in Automatically Activated
Attitudes, 81 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 815 (2001) [hereinafter Wittenbrink et al., Spontaneous]; see
also Bernd Wittenbrink et al., Evaluative Versus ConceptualJudgments in Automatic Stereotyping and Prejudice,
37 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 244 (2001) [hereinafter Wittenbrink et al., Evaluative].
325. Wittenbrink et al., Spontaneous, supra note 324, at 818.
326. Id. at 817.
327. Id. at 820.
328. Id. at 823.
329. Blair et al., Imagining, supra note 308.
330. See id. at 249.
331. See generally id.
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and pictures that were consistent with gender stereotypes (e.g., feminine, weak,
dainty, quiet)."' The results of the first three experiments demonstrated that mental
imagery moderates implicit stereotypes, reducing their impact on judgment and
behavior. 3 ' In their remaining two experiments, this research group tested the
strength of their results using measures of implicit bias other than the IAT.3 "
Overall, Dr. Blair's group concluded that their live experiments provided "compel-
ling" evidence that imagining counter-stereotypes "substantially diminished" im-
plicit stereotypes. 3 Further, these live experiments, "in combination with prior
research, suggest that both implicit and explicit stereotypes are responsive to current
inputs, including the perceiver's thoughts and social context." The implications
for this research, which show that Type B counter-stereotypes reduce implicit biases,
are profound. They empirically demonstrate that whether the counter-stereotypes
are provided externally or self-generated by deliberate imagining, it is possible to
intervene, interrupt, and reverse the impact that unconscious biases have on a per-
son's judgments and their conduct. Therefore, it logically follows that individuals
and institutions can intentionally employ counter-stereotypes to reverse the impact
that implicit biases have on their unintentional discrimination.
3. Type C Intervention: Social and Self-Motivation
Researchers have repeatedly confirmed that individuals who are highly motivated
can modify their automatic responses to implicit stereotypes and prejudices.3 4 0 Type C
interventions are particularly interesting because they operate even after an indi-
vidual has unconsciously activated their long-standing biased attitudes and beliefs.
From a law and policy perspective, these interventions are intriguing, because they
do not require any change in a person's memory in order to be effective; thus, they
avoid what implicit bias critics have called "the perils of mindreading." 4 1
The classic example of Type C intervention arises when a research subject self-
corrects to meet the expectations of the researcher. For example, people show less
automatic negativity and give more favorable racial responses about blacks in the
presence of black experimenters. 4 ' Beyond this one-on-one example, other research-
ers have shown that individuals who deliberately work to internalize egalitarian
norms communicated from the environment around them can display lower levels of
implicit prejudice. 4 ' This is a second category of Type C intervention. In a particu-
3 3 5. Id.
336. Id. at 833.
337. The fourth experiment used a "Go/No-go Association Test" (GNAT), which works to examine
implicit associations within a single category, instead of between categories, like the IAT. Id. at 834. The fifth
experiment used a Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) false memory paradigm, which is a well-recognized
memory association test of implicit attitudes. Id. at 835-36.
338. Id. at 837.
339. Id. at 838.
340. See, e.g., Sechrist & Stangor, supra note 17.
341. See Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 13.
342. William S. Lowery et al., Social Influence Effects on Automatic Racial Prejudice, 81 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 842, 851 (2001).
343. See, e.g., David Amodio et al., Individual Differences in the Activation and Control ofAffective Race Bias
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larly insightful series of studies, Drs. Gretchen Sechrist and Charles Stangor manipu-
lated participants' sense of whether their views were approved or disapproved by
peers, finding that when participants learned that their unconscious use of automatic
stereotypes served to discredit them, their interest in a positive self-image motivated
them to inhibit their unconscious stereotypes.14 4 These experiments demonstrated
the powerful influence that perceived social consensus can have on reinforcing or
dismantling implicitly held race stereotype. They further showed that social consen-
sus can reinforce or diminish students' resulting negative racial behavior. The policy
implications of these studies are profound, and therefore, the details of the Sechrist
and Stangor's two experiments bear detailed discussion.
In the first experiment, these researchers tested white students enrolled in a univer-
sity's introductory psychology class at the beginning of a semester to determine
whether they held high or low explicit anti-black preferences. 4 5 Next, students were
grouped according to their explicit preferences, and those groups were randomly
assigned to receive feedback indicating either that 810% of university students agreed
with their preferences, or that only 19% of students agreed.3 4' This feedback sig-
naled the level of social consensus around the subjects' explicit views on race.3
Experimenters then asked each student individually wait in the hallway with an
African-American student, who was ostensibly waiting to speak to the experimenter
about participating in the study, but was really a confederate. 4' This phase allowed
researchers to observe the effect that weak and strong stereotype consensus had on
students' behavior.3 4 9
In the hallway, the students found a line of seven chairs-one of which was
occupied by the confederate-and the researchers watched how closely each student
chose to sit next to the confederate.o5 0 Researchers reviewed the students' interaction
with the black student, comparing students with low-prejudice and high-prejudice,
and those who had received either low-consensus or high-consensus feedback.3 5 ' In
addition, during the wait, they asked students to predict the percentage of African-
Americans who possessed favorable stereotypical traits such as "fun-loving" or
"hard-working," and what percentage of blacks shared negative stereotypes such as
"irresponsible" or "violent," or "hostile."352
The results demonstrated that the white students' negative race prejudices were
weakest when participants perceived low social consensus on their negative views,
as Assessed by Startle Eyeblink Response and SelfReport, 84 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 738 (2003); see
also Gordon Moskowitz et al., Preconscious Control OfStereotype Activation Through Chronic Egalitarian Goals,
77 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 167 (1999).
344. Sechrist & Stangor, supra note 17, at 651.
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but that prejudices were strengthened by perceived high consensus.3 5 3 Moreover, the
results reflected the impact that stereotypes have on conduct. Low-prejudice partici-
pants who received high consensus feedback sat closer to the African-American
confederate, whereas individuals who thought their low prejudice beliefs were out of
line with the consensus tended to sit farther away.- 5 4 Conversely, high-prejudice
individuals in the high-consensus group sat farther away from the African-American
confederate than high-prejudice individuals in the low-consensus group.-5 5 In addi-
tion, high-prejudice individuals in the high-consensus group estimated higher percent-
ages of blacks held unfavorable stereotypical traits when compared with the students
whose negative race views were not validated by consensus.
The second experiment tested the accessibility of the automatic stereotypes that
were triggered by priming.-5' As in the first experiment, researchers asked students to
identify their beliefs by indicating the percentage of African-Americans who pos-
sessed positive and negative stereotypical traits, and then the students were provided
feedback that randomly showed their views were broadly shared or contradicted by
their peers.- 5 8 In the next phase, students were exposed to names frequently associ-
ated with blacks (e.g., Tyrone, Latisha) and with whites (e.g., Ryan, Amanda), and
they were asked to indicate whether the individuals were black or white on the basis
of their names.-5 9 Then, using the LDT test to measure implicit biases, researchers
assessed students' reaction times: first, a priming stimulus quickly flashed on the
screen (the word "black," the neutral word "chair," and a neutral nonword "xxxxx");
second, one of seventy-two target stimuli randomly appeared on the screen, includ-
ing traits that are stereotypic of African-Americans, traits that are not stereotypic of
African-Americans, and nonwords.- 6 o The researchers found that students who per-
ceived their individual prejudices were validated by consensus more quickly identi-
lied words that were stereotypes of African-Americans, and responded faster to
stereotypes than to nonstereotypes.3 6' The researchers conclude their two experi-
ments lend support to the hypothesis that "intergroup beliefs and behaviors are
determined by the perception that those individual beliefs are or are not shared with
others." 6 2 Moreover, both experiments demonstrate that perceived consensus not
only influences accessibility of implicit attitudes and cognitions, but also changes
discriminatory expression of explicitly held stereotypes and beliefs. 63
Studies of Type C interventions offer three important insights. First, individuals
can inhibit negative stereotypes and activate positive ones when doing so is beneficial
353. Id. at 64 9.
354. Id.
355. Id
356. Id. at 648-49.
357. Id. at 649.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 649-50. The purpose of this exercise "was to be certain that participants would associate the
prime of black to be used in the subsequent lexical decision task with African Americans . . Id. at 650.
3 6 0. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 651.
363. See id.
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to their self-image and responsive to social demands or relationships. Second, social
context can produce the requisite motivation to achieve these modifications. Third,
powerfully influential changes in social context can result from externally influencing
the extent to which individuals believe consensus with peers confrms or contradicts
anti-social stereotypes.
4. Limitations
NWhile the evidence that implicit biases can be affected and even reduced by
interventional strategies is promising, there are some important qualifications to
note. First, none of the studies suggest that implicit biases can be reduced to zero.
Thus, malleability strategies do not promise to entirely eliminate implicit biases or
their effects. Because we cannot precisely quantify the health or other disparities that
flow from the implicit bias, the extent to which changing these attitudes will reduce
discrimination is uncertain. Nevertheless, the malleability literature speaks collec-
tively of significant reductions in implicit bias and in race-conscious behavior. Sec-
ond, not all of the methods researchers have used to demonstrate the malleability of
implicit bias are created equal. Some have no immediately obvious practical applica-
tions. Others are not sufficiently understood to warrant their inclusion in policy or
law. For example, evidence that automatic prejudices decline when the features of a
black person's face change from "Negroid" (darker skin, wider nose) to European
(lighter skin, pointier nose), are practically useless or would produce ridiculous,
morally unsound and objectionable solutions to the implicit bias problem, if applied.
Still other interventions may reduce some types of implicit bias within or toward
some populations, but not all. For example, researchers do not yet understand the
reasons that some interventions, which operate to reduce unconscious stereotypes by
European Americans toward blacks, do not vary implicit prejudices among Asians.3 6 4
Other research may be theoretically important, though limited in its practical useful-
ness. For example, several studies have shown that when a person's focus of attention
is manipulated by distractions in laboratory experiments, that person will become
"cognitively busy" and produce fewer stereotypical associations during experi-
ments. 6 ' The variety of distractions that could produce busyness, the variety of
implicit biases that might be responsive to distractions, and the lack of held applica-
tions make this method one that has limited application for policy intervention.
The malleability literature has its detractors within the social science community.
In a recent article, researchers from the University of Virginia appeared to attack the
scientific record reviewed here to assert that the malleability of implicit racial bias is
overestimated.3 6 6 In fact, the three experiments these scholars reported were limited
to and sought to raise questions only about the counter-stereotype intervention
method; their results were not nearly as robust as the title of their paper suggests.3 6
364. See Lowery etal., supra note 342, at 851.
365. See Blair, supra note 14, at 244-47.
366. Jennifer A. Joy-Gaba & Brian A. Nosek, The Surprisingly Limited Malleability of Implicit Racial
Evaluation, 41 Soc. PSYCHOL. 137 (2010).
367. See id. at 139-43. Joy-Gaba and Nosek increased the number and types of exposures, as well as the
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Other researchers have criticized malleability as unidirectional; they say automatic
preferences are easily formed, but less readily reversed. 6 ' However, their conclusion
is contrary to the weight of the empirical record. 6' Another group has asserted that
declining IAT measures post-intervention are evidence of neither a changed mindset
nor a guarantee that a decrease in discriminatory behavior will follow.3 O They argue
the non-individualized labels assigned to test photographs (such as "good" or "bad")
are ambiguous, and, therefore, the IAT results most likely reflect "extrapersonal
associations" that precede the test and have nothing to do with implicit attitudes.3 71
However, even these critics admit that their objections, as far as they go, may recom-
mend changes in the IAT methodology or algorithm, but do not counsel discarding
the use of the IAT or its results entirely.3 2 Moreover, objections to the validity of the
IAT require extraordinary evidence, as the IAT has been debated so extensively that
one well-known and respected researcher has described the test's validity as a "scien-
tifc certainty."
5. Implications
The study of implicit bias presented here represents a challenge for the legal
community, not only because it challenges the notion that racial bias is a thing of the
past, and because Endings of automatic racial preferences disturbs people's convic-
tions regarding their explicit attitudes and beliefs, but because now the evidence of
malleability directly challenges the idea that prejudice due to implicit bias is beyond
the reach of anti-discrimination law. Notwithstanding its limitations, taken as a
whole, the malleability literature significantly adds to the current understanding of
the extent to which individuals' and institutions' influences can address unconscious
racism.
In summary, this section reviews a variety of intervention methods that have
proven to be effective in reducing discrimination due to implicit and unconsciously
held biases; these interventions are readily available to any individuals or institutions
wishing to take serious steps to eradicate health disparities due to physician bias.
Moreover, social scientists have drawn practical lessons from these studies that sug-
prior day-to-day familiarity that study participants had with the people in the photographs. Id. They added
photographs of admired whites to their study and had participants complete studies online as well as in
laboratories. Id. Although Joy-Gaba and Nosek did see reductions in implicit racial biases in two of their
experiments, the results were not as robust as those of prior studies. Id. Their third study showed no reduction
in implicit biases. Id. at 143. Yet, it would be foolish to generalize from these three experiments, which varied
numerous factors pertaining to counter-stereotypes in laboratory experiments. See id. at 139-43. The "surpris-
ing" limits that these researchers found are restricted to the laboratory conditions that the researchers pro-
duced. See generally id.
368. Aiden P. Gregg, et al., Easier Said than Done: Asymmetry in the Malleability of Implicit Preferences,
90 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1 (2006).
369. See supra Parts III.B.1-3.
370. H. Anna Han et al., Malleability ofAttitudes or Malleability ofthe IAT?, 46 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc.
PSYCHOL. 286 (2010).
371. Seeid.at287.
372. See id. at 296 (recommending changes in IAT methodology).
373. Laurie A. Rudman, The Validity ofthe Implicit Association Test is a Scientific Certainty, 1 INDUS. &
ORG. PSYCHOL. 426 (2008).
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gest a catalog of strategies to reduce implicit racial biases among physicians based
upon the empirical evidence. ' For example, they caution that current programs,
which focus on cross-cultural communication skills, will have limited effect on cogni-
tive bias.3 1 They also advise that accusatory or "politically correct" messages are
likely to backfire, whereas enhancing providers' understanding of the psychology of
implicit bias will encourage self-correction.3 ' Ideally, the most effective strategies
might incorporate Type A training interventions along with Type B and Type C
contextualizing strategies. The next salient question, of course, is whether the scien-
tific evidence of malleability can inform the law pertaining to intentional and uninten-
tional discrimination. I argue that it must.
Borrowing from the widely accepted method of improved medical-decision-
making that physicians call "evidence-based medicine," legal scholars have begun to
recommend that evidence-based conclusions should also inform legal disputes and
decision-making.3 7 Moreover, policymakers have proposed a systematic review of
research to determine how complex empirical evidence can be realistically translated
into social interventions. 3 " Both these insights will prove useful to reforming Title VI.
Simply put, the best behavioral research teaches that unconscious racism can be
intentionally reversed. Therefore, the preponderance of evidence on malleability war-
rants a complete re-conceptualization of the legal interventions that address and
control unintentional racial and ethnic discrimination.
C Malleability, Interventions, and Behavioral Realism
To date, the scientific evidence of malleability has played little part in the legal
scholarship analyzing how the law might intervene to address discrimination arising
from implicit biases. Correctly understood, malleability is the evidentiary and substan-
tive core to address unconscious racism that legal jurists and analysts have sought.
When Professor Charles Lawrence proposed the "Cultural Meaning Test" to replace
the Supreme Court's intentionality test under the Equal Protection Clause,3 79 he
urged a new and more accurate way to think about racial discrimination. He argued
for a doctrine that accounted both for the cultural and historical origins of racism,
and for the nature of the injuries that even unconscious discrimination inflicts.3 8 0
Lawrence explained that racism is not only a crime-for example, when it is inten-
tional-but racism is also a disease, and, as such, operates primarily as a public health
374. Diana Burgess et al., Reducing Racial Bias Among Health Care Providers: Lessons fom Social Cognitive
Psychology, 22 SoC'Y OF GEN. INTERNAL MED. 882 (2007).
375. Id. at 882.
376. Id. at 883.
377. See Terence M. Davidson & Christopher P. Guzelian, Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM): The (Only)
Means for Distinguishing Knowledge ofMedical Causation fom Expert Opinion in the Courtroom, 47 TORT
TRIAL & INS. PRAc. L.J. 741 (2012).
378. See, e.g., Ray Pawson et al., Realist Review-A New Method ofSystematic Review Designedfor Complex
Policy Interventions, 10 J. HEALTH SERVS. RES. POL'Y S1:21 (2005).
379. Lawrence, supra note 19, at 378-81. The Cultural Meaning Test has gained little traction, but
Lawrence's article continues to be one of the most cited articles of all time. Among the many reasons for its
lasting impact is the fact that it is lucid, even prescient, in its explication of unconscious racism and its impact.
380. Seeid.
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problem, because "racism is in large part a product of the unconscious.""' The cure,
Lawrence argued, was to jettison the false dichotomy that viewed unconscious or
unintentional discrimination as constitutionally acceptable, but intentional discrimi-
nation as constitutionally unacceptable.11 Certainly, the evidence that intentional
interventions can affect unconscious biases would have helped Lawrence to close this
constitutional gap.
When Linda Krieger wrote of the lack of "fit" between the real world incidence of
unconscious bias and the disparate treatment doctrine under Title VII, she com-
plained that the analytical incoherence decreases the validity of anti-discrimination
adjudication, increases litigation costs, discourages voluntary settlements, and "may
exacerbate rather than reduce intergroup tensions."-"- Krieger proposed doctrinal
adjustments, such as importing the two-tier distinction between willful and non-
willful discrimination from age discrimination doctrine, to address race discrimina-
tion under Title VII. 38 4 In a later article, psychologist Susan Fiske joined Krieger to
urge courts to "get the social science right" in light of the "enormous body of
research" that discredits judicial assumptions about the intentionality of human
behavior incorporated in disparate treatment doctrines. 8 5 However, the social sci-
ence record they referenced made no mention of malleability. 8 6 Similarly, when
Barbara Flagg advocated that the doctrine of disparate impact be reformed to remove
the assumption that "transparently white criteri [a] of decision [making]" represents a
cultural norm;3 " when Tristen Green proposed doctrinal reforms to focus on the
interplay between individual discriminatory bias and organizational systems and
structures; 38 and when Susan Sturm proposed a regulatory structural approach to
disparate treatment relying upon non-governmental intermediaries to act as change
agents, none of these scholars wrote with the benefit of the insights on malleabil-
ity. Yet, arguably, notwithstanding the strength of legal interventions scholars have
already proposed, none could be implemented without the evidence presented here.
For example, David Oppenheimer's proposal to introduce a negligence standard
into disparate treatment jurisprudence seems to virtually cry out for data on malleabil-
ity.3 90 Oppenheimer suggested liability for negligence should attach if an individual
fails to act to prevent discrimination that he knows or should know is occurring,
381. Id. at 330.
382. See id. at 323-24.
383. Krieger, supra note 115, at 1165.
384. Id. at 1166.
385. Krieger & Fiske, supra note 165, at 1020, 1034.
386. See generally id.
387. Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See"- White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of
Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953, 998 (1993); see aso Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII
Remedyfor Transparently White Subjective Decision-Making, 104 YALE L.J. 2009 (1995).
388. Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate
Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91 (2003).
389. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A StructuralApproach, 101 COLUM. L.
REv. 458 (2001).
390. See generally David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899
(1993).
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which he expects to occur, or which he should expect to occur."' Similarly, the mal-
leability evidence directly addresses the Linda Krieger's fear that a negligence regime
without guidance from cognitive psychologists might result in over-compliance or
under-compliance.311 After observing the futility of courts' search for "discrimina-
tory motive or intent," based on the faulty assumption that the most prevalent form
of discrimination today is "motivational, rather than cognitive, in origin," 9' Krieger
wrote: "unlike other scholars who advocate a 'negligence' approach to employment
discrimination, I suggest that additional empirical and theoretical work must be
done before the contours of such a duty can be precisely defined, let alone crafted
into practical and effective legal rules."- 9 4 Now, nearly two decades later, the empiri-
cal record that Krieger sought has developed. Malleability data provides an eviden-
tiary basis to give content to the reasonableness standard of care that Oppenheimer's
proposal lacked and to f11 the empirical void that gave Krieger pause.
On the other side of the discussion, scholars who have resisted the call to require
anti-discrimination law reflect the prevalence of unconscious bias should not over-
look the impact of evidence on malleability. Samuel Bagenstos questions whether
courts could realistically undertake a holistic scrutiny of workplace dynamics.3 9 5
According to Bagenstos, "insubordination theory" advocates had not articulated an
"operating theory" to describe what kinds of unconscious bias should count as
unlawful or improper, making it improper, if not impossible, for courts to penalize
any behavior. 396 Amy Wax argues the cost of fixing unpredictable and unavoidable
cognitive bias would be unproductively high.3 ' Both Wax and Bagenstos point to
the ubiquity and inevitability of implicit biases to argue that this brand of discrimina-
tion should be left unchecked. 9' Malleability evidence fundamentally challenges
this premise.
The scientific evidence reviewed in Parts II and III of this Article provides abun-
dant proof that anti-discrimination law must be refined to fit the empirically sup-
ported social science record that demonstrates how implicit and unconscious biases
cause discrimination and harm. The scientific basis for distinguishing unconscious
and implicit bias from intentional bias has eroded. In light of the evidence of malleabil-
ity, the knowledge that individuals, as well as institutions, can take affirmative steps
to intervene in and reverse implicit biases dissolves the notion that one who contin-
ues to act out of implicit racial biases lack culpability. NWhile those who ignore the
well-established and scientifically proven impact of their implicit racial biases may
not be overt racists or bigots, neither are they free of moral, and arguably legal,
responsibility to refrain from racial and ethnic discrimination. The evidence of malle-
391. Id. at 967-72.
392. Krieger, supra note 115, at 1245-47.
393. Id. at 1164.
394. Id. at 1166.
395. Samuel R Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits ofAntidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L.
REV. 1 (2006).
396. Id. at 35, 40.
397. See generally Amy Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L. J. 1129 (1999).
398. See id. at 1135-46; Bagenstos, supra note 395, at 5-10.
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ability exposes a false dichotomy between intentional and unintentional discrimina-
tion; perpetrators of both conscious and unconscious bias can take steps to reduce
their discriminatory conduct. Both may justifiably be held accountable for their
discriminatory behavior.
IV. TITLE VI-A RESPONSE TO THE NEW NoRmAL
Title VI is an appropriate starting point to construct a legal response to the
disparities that result from physicians' unconscious ethnic and racial biases. This civil
rights statute has historically been the weapon of choice in the struggle to achieve
justice and equality in the American health care system. NWhile Title VI is not the
only legal tool amenable to addressing unintentional discrimination, it is one of the
broadest civil rights statutes, and yet the Courts have most egregiously misconstrued
its drafters' original intent and application. 9 Today, Title VI liability is limited to
circumstances in which courts can identify intentional, purposeful discrimination to
make a successful disparate treatment claim, or cases showing invidious pretext
designed to shield an activity's disparate impact. 400 A generous interpretation of the
Supreme Court's restrictive construction of the law is that the Court has been stumped
by the injustice of holding actors liable for discriminatory conduct they do not
intend and cannot control. Alternatively, courts may fear the ubiquity of uncon-
scious biases could require limitless liability rules, impossible to contain. On both
counts, the social science record offers a sound evidentiary basis for addressing these
concerns. Therefore, this section proposes two reforms to Title VI in order to align
the law with the scientific record and with the true nature of modern discrimination.
Both can be accomplished through a statutory amendment that, first, restores the
private cause of action for disparate impact cases, and second, redirects courts in their
substantive construction of the law.
A. Amending Tide VI
The statutory language of Title VI must be amended to restore the law to its
original purpose and scope. To combat the subtle and entrenched forms of discrimi-
nation described throughout this Article, Title VI must be subject to private, as well
as public, enforcement. Restoring a private cause of action for disparate impact
claims will empower the victims directly impacted by both conscious and uncon-
scious racism to challenge policies and programs that harm them. Private enforce-
ment will expand and improve the government's ability to suss out discrimination
due to implicit bias, the operation and effects of which may not be easy for govern-
ment bureaucrats to discover. By its nature, unconscious racism may hide from plain
view, but the victims of the otherwise inexplicable exclusion, barriers, or offenses that
members of minority groups continue to experience will be able to bring uncon-
scious racism to the government's attention. Broader enforcement will also increase
incentives for government contractors to employ interventions that reduce discrimi-
399. See supra Part I.
4 0 0. Id.
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nation due to implicit bias. The majority of the statutory amendments needed to
accomplish this change have already been proposed before Congress;40 ' however,
this section also proposes additional language designed to squarely prohibit discrimi-
nation due to unconscious racism under Title VI.
Section 601 of Title VI should be amended to expressly provide that discrimina-
tion based on disparate impact is prohibited under the law. Section 602 should be
amended to restore a private right of action to prosecute discrimination based on
disparate impact, as well as discrimination based on disparate treatment, through
civil litigation. Additionally, language is needed in both sections to fully incorporate
the knowledge that scientists have amassed about preventing harms due to implicit
biases or unconscious racism. Thus, Sections 601 and 602 should also include lan-
guage that recognizes any failure to employ the scientifically proven methods avail-
able to reduce unconscious race bias may be prosecuted and penalized. Conversely,
the statute should provide a defense for a defendant able to discharge the burdens of
production and persuasion to show it acted reasonably to ameliorate the effects of
unconscious racism, or that its challenged activity relates to and is necessary to
achieve a substantial and legitimate non-discriminatory purpose. The amendments
should allow recovery for a plaintiff who meets the burdens of production and
persuasion to show, in addition to making out aprimafacie case, that the defendant
rejected an existing, less discriminatory practice or policy than the one challenged.
Finally, the amended language should allow for compensatory damages in cases of
intentional discrimination, punitive damages against nongovernmental entities in
cases of intentional discrimination, and equitable remedies, including attorneys'
fees, in all other Title VI cases. In short, the plain language of Title VI should be
amended to fully restore the recovery and relief that Congress has consistently in-
tended, and to protect against the discriminatory injustice that Congress has histori-
cally deplored.402
401. During the 112th Congress, the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs considered but failed to
enact a bill to amend Title VI. The proposed amendment, introduced on June 20, 2012, was titled S. 3322.
See 158 CONG. REc. S4, 460-03 (daily ed. June 25, 2012) (statement of Sen. Sherrod Brown).
402. Section 601 of Title VI would read as follows:
(a) No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
(b) (1) Discrimination based on disparate impact with respect to a program or activity is estab-
lished under this section if-
a. A Federal department or agency, or any person aggrieved, demonstrates that an entity
subject to this title has a policy or practice with respect to the program or activity that causes
a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, or national origin; and
b. The entity fails to demonstrate that the challenged policy or practice is related to, and
necessary to achieve, the substantial and legitimate nondiscriminatory goals of the program
or activity; or
c. A Federal department or agency, or the person aggrieved, demonstrates that a less discrimina-
tory alternative policy or practice exists, and the entity refuses to adopt such alternative
policy or practice.
20 14] 55
56 GEO. J. L. & MOD. CRIT. RACE PERSP. [Vol. 6:3
1. Restoring the Public-Private Enforcement Model
The public-private litigation model has historically proved to be an indispensable
weapon in the attack against subtle and complex racial discrimination. 4 03 However,
one seminal case in Title VI jurisprudence provides a vivid illustration of the impor-
tance and necessity of both public and private enforcement under this statute. In
(2) In this subsection, the term 'demonstrates' means meets the burdens of production and persua-
sion.
(c) (1) Discrimination based on disparate impact with respect to a program or activity is estab-
lished under this section if-
a. A Federal department or agency, or any person aggrieved, demonstrates that an entity
subject to this title has a policy or practice with respect to the program or activity that causes
disparate impact on the basis of race, color, or national origin; and
b. The entity has failed to act reasonably in light of scientific evidence, to mitigate discrimina-
tion due to unconscious, implicit, or unintentional biases on the basis of race, color, or
national origin.
(d) (1) Discrimination based on disparate impact with respect to a program or activity is estab-
lished under this section if-
a. A Federal department or agency, or any person aggrieved, demonstrates that an entity
subject to this title has a policy or practice with respect to the program or activity that causes
disparate impact on the basis of race, color, or national origin; and
b. The entity has failed to act reasonably in light of scientific evidence, to mitigate discrimina-
tion due to unconscious, implicit, or unintentional biases on the basis of race, color, or
national origin.
(e) (1) Discrimination based on disparate impact with respect to a program or activity is estab-
lished under this section if-
a. A Federal department or agency, or any person aggrieved, demonstrates that an entity
subject to this title has a policy or practice with respect to the program or activity that causes
disparate impact on the basis of race, color, or national origin; and
b. The entity has failed to act reasonably in light of scientific evidence, to mitigate discrimina-
tion due to unconscious, implicit, or unintentional biases on the basis of race, color, or
national origin.
(f (1) Discrimination based on disparate impact with respect to a program or activity is estab-
lished under this section if-
a. A Federal department or agency, or any person aggrieved, demonstrates that an entity subject
to this title has a policy or practice with respect to the program or activity that causes
disparate impact on the basis of race, color, or national origin; and
b. The entity has failed to act reasonably in light of scientific evidence, to mitigate discrimina-
tion due to unconscious, implicit, or unintentional biases on the basis of race, color, or
national origin.
The following language would be added to the end of Section 602 of Title VI:
(b) Any person aggrieved by the failure of an entity to comply with section 601 may bring a civil
action in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction to enforce such person's rights
and may recover equitable relief, reasonable attorney's fees, and costs. The aggrieved person
may also recover legal relief (including compensatory and, from nongovernmental entities,
punitive damages) in the case of noncompliance that amounts to intentional discrimination.
(c) Nothing in subsection (b) limits the authority of a Federal department or agency to enforce
section 601.
403. For analysis of the of both the limitations and strength of public and private enforcement to protect
civil rights, see Olatunde C.A. Johnson, The Private Attorney General: Equality Directives in American Law,
87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1339 (2012); see also Michael Waterstone, A New Vision ofPublic Enforcement, 92 MINN.
L. REv. 434 (2007).
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United States v. Fordice,404 the United States sued the governor of Mississippi, alleg-
ing that the State's failure to dismantle its racially segregated public university system
violated Title VI and the 14th Amendment. 405 However, the United States only
entered the lawsuit on a Motion to Intervene tied after black private citizens had
initiated a class action lawsuit alleging violation of the 5th, 9th, 13th and 14th
Amendments, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, and Title VI. 4 0 6 A close look at the
tortured procedural history of that case reveals the importance of the public-private
litigation model in prosecuting complex civil rights violations.
In 1969, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)4 07 tied suit
against Mississippi, after its Title VI investigation had revealed persistent and en-
trenched segregation and after its administrative efforts to develop a satisfactory
compliance plan failed.4 08 HEW refused to continue to fund Mississippi's segregated
school system under Title VI, and then wrestled with a recalcitrant Mississippi Board
of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning (the Board) over an eighteen-
year period while the Board repeatedly resisted desegregation. 409 The Board sub-
mitted complicated but ineffective compliance plans identifying new mission
statements, intricate admissions and faculty hiring targets, and elaborate changes in
their degree programs. At one point, over HEW's objection, the Board defiantly
implemented a compliance program that had been twice rejected by the government,
and segregation continued.4 10 By the mid-1980s, ninety-nine percent of Missis-
sippi's white students were still enrolled in the state's live white colleges, and seventy-
one of the state's black students still attended one of the state's three segregated black
institutions.411
Ultimately, the private Fordice litigants prevailed in their challenge against the
State of Mississippi for failing to desegregate its state university system nearly
40 years after Brown v. Board ofEducation.4 1 2 To be sure, the case did not yield a
wholly untarnished victory for educational equality in Mississippi.4 1  Nevertheless,
when Justice White wrote for the majority, his decision awarded the black citizens of
404. 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
405. Id. at 717.
406. Id. at 723-24.
407. Predecessor to the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).
408. SeeFordice, 505 U.S. at 722-23.
409. Id. at 722-23 & nn.2-3; Brief for the United States at 8-9, Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, Nos. 90-1205,
90-6588.
410. Fordice, 505 U.S. at722-24.
411. Id. at 724-25. In reading the Fordice cases, one is struck by the correctness of Professors Ralph Banks'
and Richard Ford's call for focus on the alleviation of the substantive educational, housing, and employment
inequalities that plagued Mississippi long before black students applied for admission to the state's white
universities, notwithstanding the professors' misunderstanding of the social psychology behind the IAT and
their misguided understanding of the importance of addressing subconscious bias in the pursuit of equal civil
rights for ethnic and racial minorities. See generally Banks & Ford, supra note 152.
412. Fordice, 505 U.S. at742-43.
413. The Fordice case has been widely and justifiably criticized for failing to equalize funding for Missis-
sippi's historically black universities. See generally, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Bid Whist, Tonk, and United
States v. Fordice: Why Integrationism Fails African-Americans Once Again, 81 CALIF. L. REv. 1401 (1993)
(arguing that, based on an understanding of American history, the only appropriate result in Fordice should
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Mississippi the integrationist goals they and HEW had fought together to obtain
through over twenty years of litigation.4 1 4 Reaching this outcome took the combined
effort of public and private litigators; whatever may be said about the court's refusal
to fund Mississippi's historically black institutions in that decision, there can be no
doubt that the desegregation objectives would not have been possible without the
work of private black litigants pursing disparate impact claims directly to enforce
Title VI. Fordice also teaches that the return of private enforcement alone will not be
sufficient to address the complex forms of contemporary discrimination that persist
in American society. Mississippi officials in that case might have responded more
quickly to eliminate racial injustice if, under the law, they also bore the burden to
take reasonable steps to address the racial inequality that resulted from biases that
school officials held unconsciously.
As the Fordice case demonstrates, and as history has proved, the goal of achieving
equal civil rights for racial minorities in this country is a "long game." Resistance-
indeed outright opposition to equality goals-are complex and potent. Public enforce-
ment provides institutionalized stamina but often lacks the personalized commitment
that private attorneys general bring. Moreover, when the rights at issue belong to
underrepresented minorities, as in the context of health care injustice, public enforce-
ment may wane without the incentive to serve a politically powerful interest group.
On the other hand, private enforcement alone is often sporadic and under-resourced.
When Title VI was enacted, Congress recognized that the light to eliminate inequal-
ity in health care is too weighty a goal to resign to administrative enforcement alone.
For these reasons, I recommend a return to the enforcement regime Congress origi-
nally contemplated in promulgating the Civil Rights Act of 1964."' This is the goal
of including a negligence standard of care under Title VI.
2. Introducing a Negligence Standard of Care
David Oppenheimer was first to comprehensively explore applying a negligence
standard to antidiscrimination law when he argued to reform Title VII doctrine.4 1 6
In his apologetic for the recognition of a claim against employers who fail to take all
reasonable steps to prevent discrimination in the workplace, Oppenheimer argued
convincingly that much of the Supreme Court's anti-discrimination jurisprudence
already incorporated the underlying principles of negligence law without expressly
acknowledging the claim.4 ' The same is true in the Title VI cases. In Floyd v. City of
New York,41 for example, a class of black suspects survived a motion for summary
have been the maintenance of HBCUs at an improved funding level, while also protecting the equal opportu-
nity to attend predominantly white institutions).
414. SeeFordice,505 U.S.at 742-43.
415. See Note, Finding a Cure in the Courts: A Private Right ofAction for Disparate Impact in Health Care,
16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 439 (2011) (arguing that a private cause of action should be implied under Title VI
from the PPACA).
416. Oppenheimer, supra note 390.
417. See id. at 936-72.
418. 813 F. Supp. 2d 417 (2011); see also Morales v. N.Y. State Dep't of Labor, 865 F. Supp. 2d 220
(N.D.N.Y. 2012); Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 826 F. Supp. 2d 749 (2011).
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judgment in a case alleging the police department's stop and frisk policy based on
race and national origin violated Title VI. The Floyd Court cited social psychology
studies regarding implicit shooter bias as evidence the defendant department may
not have acted reasonably to prevent racial prohling and therefore was not entitled to
dismissal.' Oppenheimer's arguments to replace the strict and intentional liability
causes of action available under Title VII apply equally to the proposal to introduce a
theory of negligent discrimination under Title VI.42 0 Such a revision would carry
several social benehts, including eliminating the need to End moral wrongfulness
before penalizing discrimination; encouraging greater care on the part of federal
contractors to avoid discrimination and discriminatory practices; and turning the
law's focus towards resolving discriminatory outcomes rather than discriminatory
motives.
The negligent discrimination model provides a structural approach that requires
institutions to manage the diversity within their organizations and minimize the
operation of discriminatory bias by individual actors within their control. The negli-
gence regime incentivizes both institutions and individuals to undertake a contextual-
ized inquiry into their conduct. 4 2 ' Negligence improves upon rigid rules proscriptions
by setting an objective and generalizable standard of care. Institutions and individu-
als can meet that standard by conforming their practices to the scientific evidence
about unconscious discrimination and the steps that can control it. This approach
also challenges courts to resolve litigants' disputes in a manner that will incentivize
social and behavioral changes. These changes must be based on the "core insight"
that "law can serve as a powerful tool for structuring . .. incentives in socially beneh-
*"422cial ways.
Here is how a negligence-based claim alleging health care discrimination due to
implicit bias would proceed under the negligence model. A plaintiff would bear the
initial burden to show that a defendant health care organization followed a facially
neutral practice that resulted in a racially disparate impact on minorities, causing
health disparities due to implicit bias. For example, a hospital may have an express
policy to provide translation services for non-English speaking patients in accordance
with National Standards for Culturally and Linguistically Appropriate Services in
Health Care, or "CLAS," standards. 4 2 3 However, due to systematic unconscious
racism, the patient may allege the standards are adhered to only rarely for patients of
the plaintiff s ethnic minority. The plaintiff would also be required to show how the
absence of translation services caused injury to non-English speaking patients. This
evidence could take the form of data comparing health outcomes for patients who
419. Floyd, 813 F. Supp. 2dat453-56.
420. See Oppenheimer, supra note 390, at 967-72.
421. See generally Green, supra note 22.
422. Krieger & Fiske, supra note 165, at 1016.
423. CLAS Standards are a series of fourteen mandates, recommendations, and guidelines to provide a
uniform framework for health care organizations to use in designing and implementing their self-imposed
programs to address health disparities. See Office of Minority Health, National Standards for Culturally and
Linguistically Appropriate Services in Health Care Executive Summary, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS. (March 2001), http://minorityhealth.hhs.gov/assers/pdf/checked/executive.pdf.
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receive translators with outcomes of those who do not. Alternatively, the evidence
might be gleaned from interviews with patients who may have delayed or declined
seeking health care due to language barriers.
Note how the negligence model improves on existing Title VI law, under which
the plaintiffs allegations in this hypothetical case would not likely be actionable.
Under the existing Title VI, the defendant health provider could respond by showing
that it had a formal policy in place for patients with limited English prohciency. After
presenting that evidence, the claim would come to an end-unless the plaintiff could
make the difficult showing that the hospital deliberately sought to deny access to
translation services for these patients. However under a reformed Title VI, the plain-
tiffs allegations would also require the hospital to demonstrate it had acted reason-
ably to reduce the likelihood that its health care professionals might avoid using
translation services due to their unconscious biases against non-English speakers. To
meet this burden, the defendant hospital could show it had taken steps that have
been empirically demonstrated to influence providers' implicit biases. The steps
taken must match scientific evidence and would replace the vague and self-serving
representations that the defendant had a "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason" or a
"justification" for its discriminatory failure to make translation services regularly
available. The hospital would have to defend its challenged practices with evidence
that its actions were reasonable in light of the scientific evidence in order to pass
muster.
The defendant hospital could show it provided stereotype-negation training for
physicians and nurses, making them aware of evidence that they hold measur-
able implicit biases against the patient's ethnic group. This defense would prevail
based on evidence that increasing awareness of biasing potential may evoke self-
correction.' Alternatively, the defendant hospital could show that its mandatory
continuing professional education program includes exposure to counter-stereotypes
for the relevant patient group, based on the evidence that this type of training
weakens racial, ethnic, and gender stereotypes.4 2' Additionally, the defendant hospi-
tal could show it had taken reasonable steps to promote workforce diversity through
programs to hire, promote and retain physicians from the patient's ethnic back-
ground into positions of leadership and authority within its organization, based on
the evidence that fewer negative stereotypes operate following interactions with minor-
ity physicians and others in authority.4 2 6 Based on evidence that implicit biases are
related to high cognitive load, another intervention that would demonstrate reason-
ableness may be related to the hospital's efforts to reduce work-loads placed on health
care providers.4 2' These evidence-based steps would be sufficient to discharge the
defendant hospital from Title VI liability. However, failure to demonstrate that
424. See, e.g., Gawronski et al., supra note 137, at 585.
425. See, e.g., Kawakami et al., supra note 292, at 871-88; Dasgupta & Greenwald, supra note 16, at
800-14; Blair & Banaji, supra note 132, at 1153-59.
426. See, e.g., Lisa Sinclair & Ziva Kunda, Reactions to a Black Professional- Motivated Inhibition and
Activation ofConflictingStereotypes, 77J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 885 (1999).
427. Ryn & Saha, supra note 242, at 995.
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implicit ethnic bias had been structurally addressed by the hospital would result in a
damages award to the plaintiff. In this way, the negligence standard operates as both
the proverbial "carrot" and "stick." On one hand, by signaling that hospitals may
avail themselves of an exculpatory defense by taking steps to inform and train physi-
cians to override their implicit biases, the negligence standard positively invites
preventative policies to remove implicit racial and ethnic discrimination from patient
care. On the other hand, restoring a private cause of action to patients who wish to
allege they were victimized by racially biased health care will penalize providers who
have failed to be vigilant in striving for justice in American health care.
B. Advantages and Objections
By and large, it is likely that courts will welcome the clarity provided by the
reforms proposed here to realign Title VI with Congress' original intent for the
law.4 2' These reforms also return Title VI jurisprudence to the Supreme Court's
traditional approach to the law. Moreover, the reasonableness standard provides an
objective and workable way to operationalize the scientific evidence we now have
about the way discrimination works and can be controlled.
1. Restoring Clarity
The United States Supreme Court's early decisions plainly established that Title VI
reached cases of unintentional discrimination.4 2 9 But the Court has wrestled with
the way to dehne and limit these causes of action. Recent decisions have focused
almost exclusively on describing the procedural, evidentiary, and remedial elements
that distinguish disparate impact claims, but they have overlooked the need to fully
dehne the substantive meaning of "unintentional discrimination." Perhaps most
destructively, the Court lost its way Alexander v. Sandoval.410 In that case, Justice Scalia
wrote for the Court that disparate impact cases were prohibited only by regulatory
rules promulgated under Section 602, but not by the Title VI itself, and therefore
could only be administratively enforced.4 ' As many commenters have written,
Justice Scalia justified this holding by extending a rejected reading of dicta from
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.4 12 Justice Scalia applied a restrictive
view of Title VI, notwithstanding the fact that Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer had long since dissented from the very reading of
428. See supra Part L.A (discussing Congressional intent underlying Title VI).
429. See Guardians Ass'n. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of N.Y.C., 463 U.S. 582, 589 (1983) (citing Lau v.
Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974)) ("The Court squarely held in Lau v. Nichols, that Title VI forbids the use of
federal funds not only in programs that intentionally discriminate on racial grounds but also in those
endeavors that have a disparate impact on racial minorities.").
430. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
431. Id. at 293; see also Note, After Sandoval-Judicial Challenges and Administrative Possibilities in Title VI
Enforcement, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1774 (2003). In addition, Justice Scalia strongly hinted that Section 602 of
Title VI might not support disparate impact claims alleging unintentional discrimination, though he declined
to decide the question. Sandoval; 532 U.S. at 281-82.
432. 438 U.S. 265 (1976); see Derek Black, Comment, Picking Up The Pieces after Alexander v. Sandoval:
Resurrectinga Private Cause ofActionfor Disparate Impact, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 256 (2002); Note, After Sandoval,
supra note 431.
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Bakke that Scalia relied upon in Sandoval.' In fact, Bakke cannot be read as a
considered majority opinion on the intentionality issue.4"' Two of the five justices
who joined the majority in Bakke, concluding that Section 601 of Title VI only
extended as far as the Equal Protection Clause and therefore encompassed only
intentional discrimination-Justices White and Marshall-subsequently wrote to
denounce this view in Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission. 4 - The
Justices, of course, could not reach this conclusion without distancing themselves
from their ruling in Bakke. Therefore, Justice White carefully explained his position:
I recognize that in Bakke five Justices, including myself, declared that Title VI on
its own bottom reaches no further than the Constitution, which suggests that ...
Title VI does not of its own force proscribe unintentional racial discrimina-
tion .... The issue in Bakke, however, was whether Title VI forbids intentional
discrimination in the form of affirmative action intended to remedy past discrimina-
tion, even though such affirmative action is permitted by the Constitution. Hold-
ing that Title VI does not bar such affirmative action if the Constitution does not is
plainly not determinative of whether Title VI proscribes unintentional discrimina-
tion in addition to the intentional discrimination that the Constitution for-
bids .... [In light of the evidence of precedent and congressional intent], it must
be concluded that Title VI reaches unintentional, disparate-impact discrimination
as well as deliberate racial discrimination."436
Justice Marshall also denounced Bakke's narrow interpretation of Title VI, writing:
"I agree with Justice White that proof of discriminatory animus should not be
required .... I frankly concede that our reasoning in Bakke was broader than it
should have been. The statement that Title VI was 'absolutely coextensive' with the
Equal Protection Clause was clearly superfluous . ... ."'7 Justice Marshall went on to
explain that "the 'effects test' is far more practical than a test that focuses on the
motive of the recipient [of federal funds], which is typically very difficult to
determine. "438
Justice Thomas' concurrence in Fordice made clear that the case involved uninten-
tional discrimination, which Title VI ought to reach, when he wrote, "[tioday we
hold that '[i]f policies traceable to the de jure system are still in force and have
discriminatory effects, those policies too must be reformed to the extent practicable
433. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 307-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
434. Id.
435. Id; see a/so Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 589-90 (1983) (opinion of
White, J.) ("The threshold issue before the Court is whether the private plaintiffs in this case need to prove
discriminatory intent to establish a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 .... I conclude, as do
four other Justices, in separate opinions, that the Court of Appeals erred in requiring proof of discriminatory
intent."); id. at 623-24 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
436. Id. at 589-93 (opinion of White, J.).
437. Id. at 615, 623 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
438. Id. at 622; see also Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287,296 (1985) ("... [D]iscrimination against the
handicapped is primarily the result of apathetic attitudes rather than affirmative animus.").
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and consistent with sound educational practices."43 9 Justice Ginsburg has written
repeatedly to explain that both conscious and unconscious biases operate to perpetu-
ate discrimination today, causing vestiges of overt discrimination that are also prohib-
ited under Title VI. For example, in her concurring opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger,440
Justice Ginsburg wrote, "[i]t is well documented that conscious and unconscious
race bias, even rank discrimination based on race, remain alive in our land, impeding
realization of our highest values and ideals." 44 ' In Adlarand Constructors v. Pena,4 4 2
she wrote, " [b] ias both conscious and unconscious, reflecting traditional and unexam-
ined habits of thought, keeps up barriers that must come down if equal opportunity
and nondiscrimination ever genuinely to become this country's law and practice."
Adding statutory language to codify the private disparate impact cause of action and
to incorporate a negligence standard into Title VI will bring certainty and clarity to
the control Title VI extends over unintentional discrimination, while silencing irrec-
oncilable voices and views that have emanated from the Supreme Court.
2. Operationalizing Reasonableness
Understandably, some courts and commenters will remain reluctant to extend
Title VI liability to penalize unconsciously motivated conduct. They may regard the
proposed amendments as penalties for mere bad thoughts. However, the health care
example used throughout this Article demonstrates that the legal liability proposed
here addresses real and present harms. Furthermore, the reforms I propose are nar-
rowly tailored. This is especially important to show in the health care example where
crafting a precise standard of care is crucial. Health care providers must not be
penalized at all times when they consider race-whether intentionally or unintention-
ally-as a factor in medical decision making, since there are times when race is a
perfectly legitimate clinical consideration. Yet, physicians must be held accountable
when they use illegitimate considerations of race to influence the delivery of medical
care while expending public funds. The proposals offered here are not entirely free
from the risk of over-inclusiveness. The ubiquity of implicit biases poses a challenge
to the goal of applying Title VI litigation to address the discrimination they cause.
However, the fact that the vast majority of Americans evince some degree of implicit
racial and ethnic bias does not mean that any effort to curb the harmful, discrimina-
tory effects of these biases will necessarily fail. The negligence standard is just, be-
cause it makes liability is predictable and avoidable, while still providing for
enforcement. The reasonableness standard is objectively discernible and one with
which individuals and institutions can comply. The proposals set forth here assume
that courts can reliably judge the reasonableness of evidence-based interventions with
appropriate flexibility. As the social science record continues to evolve, increasingly
specific and targeted measures will become relevant to Title VI claims. Courts and
43 9. U.S. v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 745 (199 2 ) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting majority opinion).
440. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
441. Id. at 345 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
442. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
443. Id. at 300 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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contractors will stay abreast of and progressively incorporate the improving methods
available to address unconscious racism.
Some may object to fashioning any legal solution at all to the problem of implicit
bias, preferring instead to allow individuals and institutions to self-regulate. Some
may object to over-regulating government contractors such as health care providers,
already burdened by a malpractice system that randomly and inefficiently imposes
liability on physicians. To these objections I point first to the abject failure of
self-regulation where unconscious racism is concerned, and second to the dogged
persistence of inequities where health disparities in particular have flourished. NWhile
the health gaps between minorities and whites have been slowly shrinking in some
categories, such as overall life expectancy, the fact remains that over the past twenty-
live years, in every race and ethnicity category, the number and proportion of all
quality measures for which disparities are measured show the vast majority of racial
differences in health and health care quality are not changing, and, in some cases, are
worsening.4 4 4 These tragic differences remain, notwithstanding an era of self-
regulation, substantial expenditures, and extensive investment in research and pro-
grams aimed at reducing disparities. The fact is that without a new approach-one
based on the evidentiary record that addresses implicit biases directly-health care
disparities will not go away. In light of the overwhelming scientific evidence that
implicit biases are both harmful and malleable, no justification remains for not
implementing Congress' original intent, expressed in 1964 when Title VI was passed,
to prohibit all forms of discrimination-whether intentional or unintentional,
conscious or unconscious, explicit or implicit-based on a person's race, color, or
national origin.
CONCLUSION
I have argued to restore Title VI to its originally intended scope. The reforms I
propose are modest: returning the statute's public-private enforcement model, and
implementing a negligence standard of care to regulate unintended discrimination.
Yet, these reforms will radically shift the social norm throughout the American
health care system, which today tolerates gross inequality in health and health care,
creating a new medical norm that values and protects justice and equality for all
patients. NWhile reforming Title VI will extend justice and equality well beyond the
health care context, it is fitting to return to health care to address the original goals
that lawmakers had in enacting Title VI because racial discrimination by hospitals
and physicians were fundamental to the law's passage in 1964.
The evidence of how implicit bias works in health care demands a new standard of
care for modern medicine. To be sure, there are important issues yet to be discussed
by providers and researchers. The evidence that implicit biases influence physicians'
clinical decision-making, patient communication, and statistical interpretation re-
quires a deeper conversation among practitioners about their commitment to the
444. See National Healthcare Disparities Report 2011, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. AND QUALITY 6
(Mar. 2012), http://www.ahrq.gov/research/findings/nhqrdr/nhdr11/nhdr11 .pdf.
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ethical principles of justice, non-malevolence, and benehcence underlying the
Hippocratic Oath. The empirical record must be expanded. Social scientists must
work to understand the extent to which implicit bias infects institutional health care
providers, nurses, physician extenders, administrators, insurers, and other actors in
the health care delivery system. The social science record regarding minority groups
beyond African-Americans is also sorely lacking. However, the need for further
research and discussion by providers no longer justifies inaction by lawmakers. The
evidence presented in this Article no longer permits lawmakers to remain bystanders
as African-, Latino-, Asian-, and Native-Americans live shorter and less healthy lives
than whites because they are victims of unregulated physician implicit biases. Uncon-
scious racism is within individual, institutional, and societal control. Unintentional
attitudes are subject to intentional control, and, most importantly, carefully struc-
tured interventions can directly address the deleterious and deadly discrimination
that implicit bias causes.
The science of implicit bias reviewed and updated here provides a solid evidentiary
basis for reforming Title VI. The evidence that these biases are malleable afhrma-
tively answers the question of whether it is morally acceptable to End a person
culpable for action from unintentional attitudes. And the continuously mounting
evidence that minority patients daily are falling victim to unconsciously racist health
care in America daily provides the compelling interest that justifies returning Title VI
to its originally intended potency so that neither conscious nor unconscious racism
in health care may be tolerated as "normal" under the law.
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